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SUMMARY 
The thesis is an analysis of the strikes at Volkswagen SA during the period 1999-2000 
and its social and political outcomes. Seen from a broader perspective, it is a case 
study of social conflict in a young democracy after the formal demise of apartheid in 
1994. 
By the time (i.e. early in 2000) events reached a climax, the company had lost 
millions of Rand in revenue and more than 1300 workers their jobs. The thesis wants 
to explain how this came to be - despite attempts by the company to establish a 
pluralistic industrial relations culture that go back to the early 1990s and after, 
ostensibly, gaining the consent of the shop stewards committee at the factory and the 
NUMSA leadership for a lucrative ("A4") export agreement. 
After studying the literature and the press, interviewing key actors in the "drama", and 
closely following the proceedings of the CCMA and the Labour Court, the thesis 
comes up with an explanation more complex than the "conventional" ones offered 
during and after the strike. The immediate cause of the strike action was the non-
acceptance of the terms of the export agreement by 13 shop stewards and their 
supporters. These shop stewards had been elected onto the VW shop steward council 
after their union (i.e. NUMSA) and the company had concluded the agreement. When 
they came out in open defiance of the agreement, they were suspended by the union 
for their unconstitutional action. They subsequently tried to rally their followers for 
their own reinstatement. 
However, the thesis shows that the strikes of 1999 and 2000 were merely two more 
outbursts of shop floor tension and conflict that had been dormant for a long time. 
Before and after 1994, there existed informal structures and factions at the shop floor 
level which refused to tow the official NUMSA "line" - a policy which increasingly 
started to embrace the ethos of "reconstruction" and economic competitiveness. 
Neither the union leadership, nor company management were able to deal with these 
informal structures and bring the dissident faction under control. Although the 
potential for more cooperation and trust did exist, both the union leadership and 
management failed to turn this into "social capital". The thesis suggest that this may 
have been possible, if there had been more direct forms of worker participation (over 
and above the shop stewards committee). Also, the haemorraging of the union 
leadership after 1994, and the increasing bureaucratisation of industrial relations did 
nothing to improve the situation. 
To make matters worse, the thesis argues, the terms ofthe export agreement were not 
properly communicated to the union rank and file. To top it all, the thesis provides 
ample evidence that the VW workers could not record any extra material gains in 
exchange for more flexible working arrangements in the wake of the shift from 
"Fordism" to "Lean Production" at the Uitenhage factory. Here, "wealth creative" 
industrial relations did not accompany the shift to lean production, as post-Fordist 
theory would like to suggest. When the 13 shop stewards and a certain percentage of 
the VW workforce came out in protest against this arrangement, no special efforts 
were made to mediate the conflict. 
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The "fallout" of the conflict includes hundreds of millions of Rand in lost company 
revenue, more unemployment in one of the poorest regions of South Africa, a drawn 
out legal process and political divisions in worker ranks and in the Uitenhage 
community. Although NUMSA admits to a "wakeup call", the relationship between 
the COSA TU affiliated union and the state is as close as ever. In the eyes of the thesis, 
however, the case of the VW strike, including the direct intervention of the head of 
state, is proof that the young, post-settlement democracy is not yet able to deal with 
social conflict in a mature way. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die tesis is 'n analise van die stakings by Volkswagen SA tydens die periode 1999-
2000 en sy sosiale en politieke gevolge. Gesien vanuit 'n breer perspektief, is dit 'n 
gevallestudie van sosiale konflik in 'n jong demokrasie na die formele be'indiging van 
apartheid in 1994. 
Teen die tyd (vroeg in 2000) wat gebeure 'n hoogtepunt bereik het, het die 
maatskappy honderde miljoene Rande in inkomste verloor en meer as 1300 werkers 
hul werk. Die tesis wil verklaar waarom dit gebeur het - ten spyte van die pogings 
deur die firma sedert die vroee 1990s om 'n pluralistiese arbeidsverhoudingskultuur te 
skep en nadat die "shop stewards" komitee by die fabriek en die NUMSA leirskap 
oenskynlik sy instemming gegee het tot 'n lonende ("A4") uitvoerkontrak. 
Na 'n studie van die literatuur en die pers, onderhoude met sleutel akteurs in die 
"drama" en 'n noukeurige monitering van die verrigtinge by die CCMA en die 
arbeidshof, kom die tesis na vore met 'n verklaring wat meer kompleks is as die wat 
tydens die staking en daama aangebied is. Die onmidellike oorsaak van die staking 
was die nie-aanvaarding van die uitvoer ooreenkoms deur 13 "shop stewards" en hul 
ondersteuners. Hierdie "shop stewards" is verkies tot die VW "shop steward" komitee 
midat die unie (d.w.s. NUMSA) en die maatskappy die ooreenkoms gesluit het. Toe 
hulle openlike opposisie teen die ooreenkoms gewys het, is hulle deur die unie 
geskors vir hul onkonstitusionele optrede. Hulle het daama hul ondersteuners probeer 
mobiliseer vir die herstel van hul posisies. 
Die tesis wys egter dat die stakings van 1999 en 2000 bloot nog twee uitbarstings was 
van 'n smeulende fabrieksvloer konflik en spanning wat vir 'n lank tyd reeds 
sluimerend was. V oor en mi 1994 het daar informele strukture en faksies op die 
fabrieksvloer bestaan wat geweier het om die amptelike beleid van NUMSA te volg -
'n beleid wat toenemend die etos van "rekonstruksie" en ekonomiese 
mededingendheid aangeneem het. Nog die unie leierskap, nog die maatskappy bestuur 
was instaat om die informele strukture te hanteer en die afwykende faksie onder 
beheer te bring. Alhoewel die potensiaal vir meer samewerking en vertroue bestaan 
het, het beide die unie leierskap en die bestuur daarin gefaal om dit te omvorm tot 
"sosiale kapitaal". Die tesis suggereer dat dit moontlik sou gewees het as daar 'n meer 
direkte vorm van werkers deelname (bo en behalwe die "shop stewards" komitee) 
bestaan het. Die verlies aan kwaliteit leiers mi 1994, sowel as die toenemende 
burokratisering van arbeidsverhoudings het ook nie gehelp om die situasie te beredder 
me. 
Om dinge te vererger, redeneer die tesis, is die klousules van die uitvoer ooreenkoms 
nie behoorlik aan die gewone unie lede verduidelik nie. Om alles te kroon, voorsien 
die tesis genoeg bewyse dat die VW werkers nie enige ekstra materiele voordele kon 
aanteken in ruil vir meer buigsame werksreelings as deel van die skuif vanaf 
"Fordisme" na "Lean Production" by die fabriek in Uitenhage nie. Hier het 
"welvaartskeppende" arbeidsverhoudings nie hand-aan-hand gegaan met die skuif na 
"lean production, soos post-Fordistiese teorie wil suggereer nie. Toe die 13 "shop 
stewards" en 'n sekere persentasie van die VW arbeidsmag openlik daarteen 
geprotesteer het, is geen spesiale poging aangewend om die konflik te besleg nie. 
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Die skade van die konflik sluit honderde miljoene Rande aan verlore maatskappy 
inkomste, meer werkloosheid in een van Suid-Afrika se armste streke, 'n uitgerekte 
regsproses en politieke verdeeldheid onder werkers en in die Uitenhage gemeenskap 
in. Alhoewel NUMSA erken dat hulle "wakkergeskrik" het, is die verhouding tussen 
die COSA TU geaffilieerde vakunie en die staat so eng soos vantevore. In die oe van· 
die tesis egter, is die geval van die VW staking, insluitende die direkte ingryping deur 
die staatshoof, 'n bewys daarvan dat die jong, post-skikking demokrasie nog nie 
gereed is om sosiale konflik op 'n ryp manier te hanteer nie. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The phenomena this thesis wants to explain is: why did the workers take such 'militant' 
action, why did this 'wild cat' strike take place, and what are its outcomes? 
In February 2000 Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA) dismissed 1300 workers. These workers 
did not return to work after an ultimatum set by the National Union of Metalworkers South 
Africa (NUMSA) and the company. With illegal industrial action, a wildcat strike, the 
workers wanted to support 13 shop stewards. The 13 shop stewards were suspended firstly by 
NUMSA and thereafter by VWSA. 
These 13 shop stewards, also known as the 'indlu ye ngewu' (house of senators), stood in 
opposition to the A4 export agreement between NUMSA and VWSA. This agreement 
integrated the South African part of the Volkswagen group into the global production system 
of Volkswagen. 
In 1989 VWSA introduced a holistic approach to worker participation, an approach which is 
based on a pluralistic industrial relations philosophy (Anstey, 1990: 230-231 ). This means 
basically that management and workers will pursue different antagonistic interests. The labour 
union NUMSA and the company VWSA articulate these interests. 
VWSA believed that these differences could be resolved by a system of collective bargaining 
that will allow some balance of power. This model recognises the legitimate role of the labour 
union in helping to resolve the conflict in a constructive manner. Brian Smith, the director of 
human resources at VWSA, emphasised that "negotiations must take place between strong 
and representative groups, who have the ability to honour agreements and build mutual trust" 
(Anstey, 1990: 230-231 ). 
In 1998 VWSA was awarded the A4 export contract. Owing to this contract, the company had 
to reorganize and increase production. The company had to produce 40 000 Golf cars 
annually for the European (U.K.) and Australian markets. Therefore the company negotiated 
the 'A4 export agreement' with NUMSA, the union at the factory. The company and union 
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claim that the agreement was extensively communicated within the factory. The agreement 
resulted in the recruitment of 850 new employees, the introduction of new work practices 
such as group work, a new holiday corridor system, reduced tea breaks and a new wage 
payment system and that the workers had to collect their wages at a local bank. A group of 13 
shop stewards, known as the 'indlu ye ngewu' (house of senators), had concerns with the 
agreement and opposed the agreement. 
The South African president condemned the striking workers at VWSA for striking illegally 
and damaging South Africa's international investment reputation (Mbeki, State of the Nation 
address: 2000, Feb 4). What was behind this conflict? 
The explanation of the conflict is laid out in chapter five. Before this, I review literature on 
various bodies of theories of social conflict, the state, labour and the market in developing 
countries, labour union literature, and finally elaborations on industrial conflict and trust, 
takes place in chapter two, after which I discuss the methodology of this thesis in chapter 
three. 
After this I continue with an overview of what happened in Uitenhage in 1999 and 2000, and 
then finally apply the discussed literature to the social conflict at Volkswagen South Africa. 
I describe this social conflict, explain it, and analyze what functions it serves in the local 
environments of Uitenhage and South Africa. 
2 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Social Conflict 
Introduction 
In this chapter I review theories, and try to find concepts and perspectives to interpret the 
strike at VWSA. 
2.1 Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser 
In his work Simmel wants to show that conflict and association as well as conflict and peace 
require each other and that this mutual connection can lead to social change. But this is not 
necessarily so, and this does not necessarily lead to social progress (Bonacker, 1996: 69). 
His model of historical processes is therefore closer to Nietzsche's model in that history can 
be seen as the 'Wiederkehr des Immergleichen', the repetition of the same historical 
processes. So he stands in contrast to Marx's model of emancipation, and also in contrast to 
Hegel's model of enlightenment (Bonacker, 1996: 57). 
Simmel can be regarded as one founder of Conflict Sociology (Bonacker, 1996: 55). His 
essay Der Streil builds the foundation for his sociological elaboration on social conflict 
(Bonacker, 1996: 55). 
2.1.1 Conflict and association 
Georg Simmel can be regarded as a representative of formal sociology. This means that he 
introduces a differentiation between form and content, between society and individual. In 
relation to the analysis of societal relations, Simmel was mainly interested in the forms of 
association (' Vergesel/schafiung). However, forms should be separated from their contents. 
From an individualistic school of thought Simmel explains 'Vergesellschaftung' as any kind 
of relation between individuals. In other words, interaction. "These interactions grow out of 
particular instincts or purposes, erotic, religious or simply social instincts. Purposes like 
attack, defend, play, acquire, help, instruct and endless others bring about that the individual 
decides to associate, decides to help, fight, together, with others - takes action. That means 
that the individual takes action in correlation with others individuals, which further includes 
3 
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that the individual effects and is effected by his action" (Bonacker, 1996: 56). So the human 
desire, or preferably the instinct, constitutes the material foundation for association. 
2.1.2 Ambivalent conflicts 
The fact that the individual is only able to satisfy his/her needs and instincts in connection 
with others leads to a social context in which forms of interaction emerge that historically stay 
constant, and because of that reason becomes the subject of sociology in general. 
For Simmel there was not only one force or impulse for that instinct. He describes it in similar 
terms to Freud, insofar as he sees two 'Bedilrfnisstrukturen' -structures of needs that stand 
beside each other and then stand in correlation with the different forms of association. On the 
one hand these are associative and social tendencies, and on the other hand there are the dis-
associative and individual instincts of the individual. According to Simmel, integration and 
differentiation are together the driving forces that build the ambivalence that constructs 
'Vergesel/schaflung'. 
The unity of these two so dichotomously perceived needs leads to interaction i.e. 
'Vergesellschaflung'. Simmel tried to understand the "polar differences as one life" as 
integration and differentiation (Bonacker, 1996: 57). The human desire, or better, instinct, 
constitutes the material foundation for association. 
2.1.3 Four forms of 'Vergesellschaftung' 
Simmel differentiates between four different kinds of conflicts of interaction between 
individuals - that is, four forms of association. 
• Firstly, the conflict between individuals can lead to the formation of interest groups or 
groups in general; 
• Secondly, the associations of individuals lead to an affective relation 'between the 
individuals that can strengthen the cohesion of the group, but at the same time be the 
reason for the break out of even more intense and faster conflicts because of the 
heterogeneity of the individuals. The association of individuals in Simmel's thought 
can be the catalyst and the impulse for an internal group conflict; 
4 
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• Thirdly, conflicts emerge as a reason for the association of other associations, because 
the units within an association try to improve their own position in the social strata. 
This leads then to the association with other groups to strengthen their own position 
(as in Machiavellian thought); 
• Fourthly, the association of groups leads to bigger associations or bigger groups. 
Because of the increased heterogeneity of bigger groups the conflict potential 
increases, the identities of the sub-groups of the bigger association do not disappear 
immediately, and integration of these sub-groups takes time. Political coalitions and 
workers' unions can be taken as an example because in this form of association, in 
most of the cases, there is one partner who wants to strengthen it's own profile. 
Simmel was not that interested in giving explanations for industrial conflict in general. His 
main interest lay in the forms of associations and not their purpose - there he makes the 
difference between 'form' and 'content' of social conflict. 
Coser argues with Simmel that social conflicts are a form of association and socialisation that 
result in social change only under unlikely structural conditions. 
Like Popper, Coser differentiates between "changes of the system" and "changes within the 
system" and further asks if these conflicts are functional or dysfunctional for the social 
system. Coser continues to argue that a society in general is based on an unequal distribution 
of power, wealth and status. Coser defines social conflict as a struggle over values and claims 
to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, 
injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1964: 8). 
2.2 Ralf Dahrendorf 
According to Dahrendorf throughout the history of Western political thought, two views of 
society have stood in conflict. Both of these views are intended to explain what has been, and 
will probably continue to be, the most puzzling problem of social philosophy: "How human 
societies cohere, on the one side, and what drives the process of change of a society on the 
other side" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 157). 
5 
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2.2.1 Conflict definition 
According to Dahrendorf all relations between sets of individuals that involve an 
incompatible difference of objective - i.e., in its most general form, a desire on the part of 
both contestants to attain what is available only to one - are relations of social conflict. "The 
general concept of conflict does not necessarily imply ... Conflict may assume the form of civil 
war, or of parliamentary debate, of a strike, or of a well-regulated negotiation" (Dahrendorf, 
1959: 135). 
In his definition of 'conflict' Dahrendorf includes all sorts of contests. In everyday discourse a 
football game, a competition between applicants for a job, a parliamentary debate are usually 
not called conflict, but Dahrendorf uses the term 'conflict' to describe contests, competitions, 
disputes and tensions as well as manifest clashes between social forces (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
135). 
Conflict is social if it is derived from the structure of the social system as such, when it is 
"supra-individual" (Dahrendorf, 1961: 24). For example, the conflict a practical doctor 
experiences between the expectations of the patient and the insurance company of the patient. 
It does not matter who the doctor is; all doctors stand between these two expectations. 
2.2.2 Power and authority 
Dahrendorfs main argument is that the structural foundation of social conflicts can be found 
in the distribution of authority. Max Weber defined power as the "probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which probability rests", whereas authority is the "probability that a 
command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group or person" (Weber, 
1947: 28). The difference between power and authority consists in the fact that power is 
essentially tied to the personality of individuals, whereby authority is always associated with 
social positions or roles. Authority can also be described as legitimate power. 
Where power or authority structures are present there are always conflicts that emerge out of 
these structures, and the most general purpose of these conflicts is the changing of the present 
power or authority structures. 
6 
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The institutionalisation of the need to enhance one's own position in the hierarchy of power or 
authority builds one foundation of a modem democracy, because authority is legitimate 
power, that can be sanctioned in cases of non-compliance through the super ordinate. 
According to Dahrendorf the social conflicts over power and authority are most probably the 
heaviest, most general and functional forms of social antagonisms. 
2.2.3 Intensity and violence: The variability of class conflicts 
According to Dahrendorf, in class theory the possession of authority does not figure as a value 
sought for its own sake but as an opportunity to realise specific interests (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
232). 
"That conflict is variable means that its intensity and violence are variable; but the two may 
vary independently and are, therefore, distinct of any conflict situation" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
211 ). "A particular conflict may be said to be of high intensity if the cost of victory or defeat 
is high for the parties concerned" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 211 ). The category of intensity refers to 
the energy expenditure and degree of involvement of conflicting parties, whereby the category 
of violence rather relates to its manifestation than to its causes; it is a matter of the weapons 
chosen by conflicting groups to express their hostilities. 
As soon as conflict groups have been permitted and been able to organise themselves, the 
most uncontrollably violent form of conflict - that of guerrilla warfare - is excluded. The fact 
of organisation presupposes some degree of recognition which in turn makes the violent forms 
of conflict unnecessary and, therefore, unlikely. This is not to say that conflicts between 
organised groups cannot be highly intense and violent, but the conditions of organisation are 
merely one factor. 
The intensity of class conflict 
• Decreases to the extent that the conditions of class organisation are present; 
• Decreases to the extent that class conflicts in different associations are dissociated 
(and not superimposed); 
• Decreases to the extent that the distribution of authority and the distribution of rewards 
and facilities in an association are dissociated (and not superimposed); 
• Decreases to the extent that classes are open (and not closed) (Dahrendorf, 1959: 237). 
7 
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The violence of class conflict 
• Decreases to the extent that the conditions of class organisation are present; 
• Decreases if absolute deprivation of rewards and facilities on the part of a subjected 
class gives way to relative deprivation; 
• Decreases to the extent that class conflict is effectively regulated (Dahrendorf, 1959: 
239). 
2.2.4 Institutional pluralism 
Any given society has many different institutions. The church, the state, the economy, the 
military, the legal system, these 'leading' institutions should, according to Dahrendorf, have 
an own unique identity and further be separated (i.e. separation of power). 
In societies where this is not the case, where one group dominates all institutions, the intensity 
of conflicts increases. The more pluralistic the structure of a society becomes, the more the 
intensity of conflicts is likely to decrease. If the different institutions are not separated from 
each other any conflict is a conflict about the whole system and therefore is more intense than 
a conflict over one institution. 
2.2.5 Regulation of conflicts 
"The idea that conflicts may be resolved could mean, and often is thought to imply, that it is 
possible to eliminate given conflicts altogether" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 237). However, in 
Dahrendorfs view, conflicts persist and cannot be resolved. Neither can they be suppressed in 
the long term. 
The attempt to resolve and suppress social conflict is something that can be more often found 
in autocratic and totalitarian regimes. In democratic regimes we can find more often the 
regulation of social conflict. By this Dahrendorf means such forms as conflict control as 
address themselves to the expression of conflicts rather than their causes, and that implies the 
continued existence of antagonisms of interest and interest groups. According to Dahrendorf 
effective conflict regulation presupposes three factors: 
8 
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First, for effective conflict regulation to be possible, both parties to a conflict have to 
recognise the necessity and reality of the conflict situation and, in this sense, the fundamental 
justice ofthe cause ofthe opponent. 
The crucial factor for effectively regulating conflicts is recognition, and even the emphasis, of 
systematic divergence and opposition. "The attempt to obliterate lines of conflict by ready 
ideologies of harmony and unity in effect serves to increase rather than decrease the violence 
of conflict manifestations" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 226). 
"A second requisite of effective conflict regulation is the organisation of interest groups. So 
long as conflicting forces are diffuse, incoherent aggregates, regulation is virtually 
impossible" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 226). 
"Thirdly, in order for effective conflict regulation to be possible, the opposing parties in social 
conflicts have to agree on certain formal rules of the game that provide the framework of their 
relations" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 226). 
By rules of the game, Dahrendorf means such procedural norms that are binding for the 
contestants without prejudicing the outcome of the contest. These rules of the game can serve 
their function only if and as long as they put both parties on an equal footing and do not imply 
any substantive stipulations disabling one or the other conflict group. Once these pre-
requisites of conflict regulation are present, varying forms of regulation itself can come into 
operation. 
The first form of conflict regulation appears to consist in the operation of certain institutions, 
which provide the framework for discussion and decision-making with regard to conflicting 
issues. "These institutions may be described as parliamentary bodies in which conflicting 
interest groups or their representatives meet in order to carry on their conflict in a relatively 
peaceful and patterned manner" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 228). 
According to Dahrendorf there are four requirements that have to be satisfied if institutions 
are to regulate conflict in an effective way. 
9 
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They must be autonomous bodies, their role must be obligatory, they have to be democratic 
and their place in a given association has to be monopolistic. 
In many cases, in order for the violence of group conflict to be reduced, autonomous 
conciliation has to be supplemented by other forms of conflict regulation. The supplement can 
be described as the 'third party' that comes into play. The mildest form of outside intervention 
into conflicts Dahrendorf describes as mediation, where both parties agree to consult an 
outsider who is asked to give advice but whose advice will have no binding force for the 
parties. Another form of outside intervention by legal institutions is called arbitration. 
Dahrendorf differentiates between two forms of arbitration. They differ in the kind of 
commitment to an arbitrator to which both parties have agreed. Further there is a 'political' 
and a 'judicial' form of arbitration. 
The first suggests that it is the task of arbitration to find a workable compromise between 
conflicting issues accepted as such. Dahrendorf points out that this approach promises 
success. He sees five "favourable consequences for conflict regulation. Reduction of 
irrationality, removal of non-rationality, exploration of solutions, assistance in graceful retreat 
and raising the cost of conflict" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 229). 
The second conception views conflicts from a legalistic point of view, i.e., ascribes to the 
arbitrator the task of judging the merits of conflicting issues in terms of fixed standards of 
'right' and 'wrong'. "Where this is the case, the rules of the games are likely to prejudice the 
case of one or the other party, for if one side or claim is declared right in an ultimate legal and 
moral sense, conflict itself is not recognised and the other party is likely to feel so frustrated 
as to resort to violence" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 229). 
Dahrendorf continues in pointing out the danger of the latter conception in which he sees that 
the dichotomy (right or wrong) may be transported to other social systems. He concludes that 
the legal arbitration conception is dangerous from the point of view of effective conflict 
regulation. 
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Dahrendorf describes social conflicts from a dialectic, Marxian point of view. He argues that 
the antagonism between capital and labour cannot be solved and therefore needs constant 
mediation. 
Our assumption is that social conflicts help social systems to firstly become integrated, and 
secondly, conflicts help social systems to become wider, as new institutions and parties 
evolve. 
The acceptance of the antagonism between capital and labour builds the foundation for a 
pluralistic industrial relations philosophy. Pluralistic basically means that there are only two 
divergent interests. Dahrendorf mentions that it is a central task of the political arena to 
regulate conflicts (Dahrendorf, 1959: 229). In the rational regulation of social conflicts 
Dahrendorf sees one of the major tasks of the political system. 
2.3 Labour unions oligarchy and industrial conflict 
There are a number of theorists who argue that unions Jose their militancy as they become 
'established', i.e. as social systems develop they become functionally more differentiated. 
R. Lester argues that there is no uniform pattern of evolution that all unions must go through. 
However he sees some trends. Firstly, general tendencies and long run trends: 
• As the rate of union expansion slows down, a psychological ageing tends to spread 
throughout the organisation; 
• Union headquarters tend to expand and democratic checks at the local level weaken; 
• As a union stabilises and ages, the top leadership becomes more administrative in 
character and the differences between union executives and management diminish; 
• The more successes the unions achieves, the more they tend to reduce their areas of 
potential expansion and innovation and, consequently, some of their dynamic 
qualities; 
• With increased bargaining experience and rising living standards, the differences 
between manual and white-collar workers tend to narrow and the areas of conflict and 
worker protest tend to be reduced; 
11 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• As umons gain employer acceptance and their objectives broaden, the differences 
between unions and other community organisations tend to decrease; 
• Increasing security for the union and for the present leadership serves as a moderating 
influence; less rivalry and fewer challenges reduce the pressure and incentives for 
militant exploitation of unions' bargaining power (Lester, 1958: I 06-1 07). 
Secondly he presents some short-term movements and swings: 
• Such movements cause actual developments to deviate from the long run trends but 
generally do not basically alter the latter, and the influence of the trends predominates 
over long periods of time; 
• Dynamic upswings that affect much of the labour movement may be promoted by a 
variety of external developments or even by a general internal upheaval; 
• Years of disturbance, strain and challenge for trade unionism are followed by of 
deceleration and comparative stability, with the long-term tendencies predominating 
(Lester, 1958: 111-112). 
I end this section with a quote from Richard Hyman: "The unions (in the U.K.) had become in 
a very real sense a part of the 'establishment'. Their association with the government and 
employers on scores of committees of all kinds and their accepted right to be consulted on any 
object affecting their members directly or indirectly made them an important influence in the 
nation's councils and also, many people felt, imposed a responsibility on them. They had 
become a part of the body of the state in many of its intricate ramifications, instead of, as they 
once were, something outside the state and in some sense a rival power" (Hyman, 1989: 48). 
Maryann Keller and Eric Mann in their work on the General Motors US transformation during 
the 1980s point out that besides the official communication structures in the factory, there are 
informal lines of communication that are essential for understanding the factory (Keller, 1989: 
119). By putting new structures in place, i.e. group work, the old structures were destroyed 
and had to be rebuilt (Mann, 1988: 86). 
2.3.1 The "iron law of union oligarchy" 
Lipset and Michels argue that over time unions become less democratic. To summarize them: 
• Unions, like all other large-scale organisations, tend to develop a bureaucratic 
structure, that is, a system of rational organisation which is hierarchically organised. 
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The price of increased union bureaucracy is increased power at the top. Most unions 
have given their executive boards the right to suspend local officials for violating 
policies of the central bodies; 
• Control over the formal means of communication within the organisation is almost 
exclusively in the hands of the officials; 
• In most unions, one of the chief factors perpetuating the power of incumbents is the 
administration's almost complete monopoly of political skills and the absence of those 
skills among the rank and file. The union official, to maintain his position, must 
become adept in political skills. The average worker on the other hand, has little 
opportunity or need to acquire them; 
• The leaders want to stay in office - every trade union official has moved up in the 
status hierarchy by becoming an official. There is a basic strain between the values 
inherent in society's stratification system and the democratic values of the trade union 
movement. Once high status is secured, there is usually a pressing need to at least 
retain and protect it. The situation of the leaders of most unions is such that they wish 
to stay in power and will adopt dictatorial tactics to do so. (Lipset, 1972: 162-163). 
Lipset elaborates that oligarchy only becomes a problem in systems which assume as part of 
their public value system the absence of oligarchy, that is, democracy. 
2.3.2 Industrial conflict 
The term industrial conflict refers to all expressions of dissatisfaction within the employment 
relationship, especially those pertaining to the employment contract and the effort bargain. 
Generally there are two forms of industrial conflicts: formal ones and informal ones. Informal 
industrial conflict is so labelled because it is not based on any systematic organisation, results 
directly from a sense of grievance, and supposedly is wholly expressive in nature (Marshall, 
1998: 305). Industrial sociologists have also regarded spontaneous walkouts and strikes as 
examples of informal industrial conflict. Formal industrial conflict is reserved for organised 
expression of conflict articulated through a trade union or other worker representative 
(Marshall, 1998: 305). 
2.3.3 The strike 
Richard Hyman has defined a strike as "a temporary stoppage of work by a group of 
employees in order to express a grievance or enforce a demand" (Hyman, 1998: 46). Further 
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he has provided us with an enlightening comparison. "The 'classic' strike is in many respects 
the industrial equivalent of war between nations. Like war, it is sometimes described as the 
conduct of industrial relations by 'other means', but is normally regarded by all concerned as 
sufficiently momentous an event to be planned with some care and launched only after 
intensive efforts at peaceful resolution of the question at issue" (Hyman, 1989: 47). 
Hyman argues that "a strike is a social phenomenon of enormous complexity which, in its 
totality, is never susceptible to complete description, Jet alone complete explanation" (Hyman, 
1989: 46). Hyman continues, "The miners, the sailors, the longshoremen, the loggers, and, to 
a much lesser extent, the textile workers form isolated masses, are almost a 'race apart'. They 
Jive in their own communities ... these communities have their own codes, myths, heroes, and 
social standards. There are few neutrals in them to mediate the conflicts and dilute the mass. 
All people have their grievances, but what is important is that all the members of each of 
these groups have the same grievances" (Hyman, 1989: 49). 
2.3.4 Informal and wildcat strikes 
I will now focus on the informal forms of strikes that also have been described as 'wildcat 
strikes' and unorganised strikes. In unorganised conflict workers typically respond to the 
oppressive situation in the only way open to them as individuals: "By withdrawal from the 
source of discontent, or in the case of certain forms of individual sabotage or indiscipline, by 
reacting against the immediate manifestation of oppression. Such reaction rarely derives from 
any calculative strategy" (Hyman, 1989: 48). It is irrelevant if the oppression is caused by a 
union or a company. One definition of wildcat strikes by Hyman and Knowles points out that 
an unofficial strike has been defined as one which is not recognised by the executive 
committee of a union. "An unconstitutional strike is one in breach of an agreed disputes 
procedure: such procedures normally specify a series of meetings through which a grievance 
must be processed, in an attempt at peaceful resolution, before a stoppage of work becomes 
legitimate" (Hyman, 1989: 49). 
I end the elaboration on wildcat strikes with the following quote: "The maximum weapon 
against the system (including union and company) is a simple absence- the strike, which is a 
withdrawal of labour. It can win wage increases, some improvements in working conditions, 
and in rare cases some constitutional rights. But it can never overthrow a social regime. As a 
political weapon, strikes are nearly always profoundly ineffectual. .. The strike is fundamen-
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In many cases companies, especially in the automobile sector, have moved their production 
facilities to countries with cheaper labour costs. That has also been described as the 'New 
International Division of Labour'. For example, German Volkswagen workers have to 
compete against their Czech and South African colleagues with different social standards, i.e. 
social standards are a cost factor. 
Governments in the developed as well as the developing worlds have chosen to implement 
direct investment-friendly policies. The export processing zones (EPZ) in China can be taken 
as one example. In this case the Chinese Government promoted the development of industrial 
clusters and export processing zones, i.e. areas where companies are located that produce 
synergies with other companies located in the area (Castells, 2001: 462). The most famous 
example of such a cluster is Silicon Valley in California. 
In the Eastern Cape, Good Year Tires, Hell a Lights, Shatterproof windows and HJS exhausts 
form a cluster. They are all located in the direct environment of the Volkswagen plant. 
Together these companies form an industrial cluster in the new Nelson Mandela Metropole. 
The South African government tries to work hand in hand with labour and capital to achieve 
the main objective, namely the creation of jobs. The government tries to promote the 
production of goods for the export market, of which Volkswagen is only one example in the 
area. 
Ravi Naidoo, director of the South African National Labour and Economic Development 
institute, states that "democratisation in South Africa has been accompanied by the growth of 
a range of institutions and processes through which workers and their organisations may gain 
varying degrees over economic and social decisions that directly affect their lives. These 
developments are themselves varied, and have been known by a variety of names: eo-
determination, worker participation, concentration, tripartism or multipartism (Adler, 2000: i). 
Anstey and Maller argued that adversarial labour relations remained dominant and that 
workers had very little control over economic decisions (Anstey, 1995: 46; Maller, 1992: 
122). 
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Glen Adler points out that "one of the most innovative aspects of South Africa's democ-
ratisation has been the emergence of institutions and processes through which workers and 
unions may engage the state and business to gain varying degrees of control over important 
economic decisions". He continues that "these institutions and processes are unique among 
developing countries in Africa and elsewhere that are undergoing democratisation. Taken 
together, these features of South Africa's transition have the potential to deepen significantly 
the political democracy won in 1994 by dramatically expanding the participation by a range 
of citizens and their organisations" (Adler, 2000: 1 ). As mentioned the potential for partici-
pation has been described as 'embryonic'. Lipset elaborates on why union members often do 
not participate in union matters: "Ordinarily, however, few members show much interest in 
the day-to-day political process within the union, apathy of the members is the normal state of 
affairs. Most union members, like other people, spend most of their time at work or with their 
families. Their remaining free time is generally taken up by their friends, commercial 
entertainment and other personally rewarding recreational activities (Lipset, 1972: 164). 
However the South African Government has chosen two approaches simultaneously. On the 
one hand the democratisation of the workplace (LRA) and on the other hand the 'gearing-up' 
for 'export-led development' (GEAR). On the one hand there is the alliance between the 
ANC/COSATU/SACP, and on the other hand there is the alliance between government, 
business and labour i.e. NEDLAC. 
The case in Uitenhage shows the difficulties of communicating these two approaches. One 
labour activist stated that "this younger (NUMSA) leadership was struggling with massive 
unemployment and other new and complex issues in a period where eo-determination was the 
buzzword" (Rachleff, 2000:4). 
The two above-mentioned approaches do not stand in opposition to each other, but they 
appear to be paradoxical at first glance and therefore difficult to communicate. Labour 
unionists in developed countries as well as developing countries have problems in communi-
cating these two 'paradoxical' approaches to the workforce. This is particularly the case in 
times of increased retrenchments of workers through the 'forces of globalisation'. 
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2.4.1 Gear and export-led development 
Already in the late 1980s, the old regime began to place greater emphasis on the need for 
export-oriented manufacturing (Oberhauser, 1993: 5) in order to enhance international 
competitiveness, encourage exports and save foreign exchange (Adler, 2000:1 08). 
In 1996 the new South African Government implemented the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution Policy. The policy was formulated to meet with the objectives set by the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme. These objectives were to "satisfy basic needs, 
develop human resources, increase democratic participation in the democratic institutions and 
implement the RDP with all its different objectives" (RDP, 1994: 6). 
The objectives of the GEAR policy are, "a competitive fast-growing economy which creates 
sufficient jobs for all work-seekers, a redistribution of wealth through income and oppor-
tunities in favour for the poor, a society in which sound health, education and other services 
are available to all; and an environment in which homes are secure and places of work are 
productive" (GEAR, 1996, web). 
GEAR has also been described as an 'export-driven development strategy', because it tries to 
attract foreign direct investment for the creation of jobs, wealth and competitiveness on the 
world market. The policy says: "Development and employment are needed to provide a better 
life for all South Africans. We are confident that our social partners will join us in the 
combined efforts needed to achieve this goal" (GEAR, 1996, web). The National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was one forum to formulate policy and to 
achieve the set goals. In this forum, the state, the economy, labour and the 'community', 
negotiate to find 'the right' policies. 
2.4.2 Corporatism 
The concept corporatism refers to a type of society in which various large-scale organisations 
with powerful vested interests are involved in the economic, social and political decision-
making process. In the 1970s, it was argued that a corporatist relationship existed between 
employers' associations and trade unions, which along with the state were jointly involved 
economic decision-making. In relation to trade unions, there has been much debate as to 
whether corporatism was a form of working class incorporation, or an expression of worker 
power (Marshall, 1998: 122). 
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Corporatism, in particular, has been associated with union success in weathering the storm of 
globalisation (Adler, 2000:27). According to Turner (1991: 12), in the period of heightened 
deregulation and global competition union success or decline and the stability of industrial 
relations system are largely determined by two critical variables: "(First) the extent to which 
unions, as broad national pattern, are integrated into processes of managerial decision-
making, especially concerning work reorganisation; and second, the existence of laws or 
corporatist bargaining arrangements that regulate firm level union participation from outside 
the firm" (Adler, 2000:27). 
In South Africa the new 'corporatist' institution was named National Economic Development 
and Labour Council (NEDLAC). On 18 February 1995, the NEDLAC was launched and its 
origins lie in the struggle against apartheid, against unilateral decision-making, and in the 
calls from all sectors of society for decisions to be taken in a more inclusive and transparent 
manner. 
President Mandela remarked at NEDLAC's launch, "that our democratic gains will be shallow 
and persistently threatened if they do not find expression in food and shelter, in well-paying 
jobs, and rising living standards" (NEDLAC, 1995, web). 
Fig 1. Martinussen's Corporatist Structure 
Firm <1111 Community _____.. State 
+ Policies and strategies 
+ Internal organisation 
+ Intra-firm behaviour 
policies and strategies 
institutions 
intra-government behaviour 
~ 
Market and Society 
Structures and institutions 
(Source: Martinussen, J (1999): Society, State and Market; HRSC Pretoria) 
NEDLAC was established in order to promote economic growth, participation in economic 
decision-making and social equity and to seek consensus and conclude agreements pertaining 
to social and economic policy. 
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To summarise, NEDLAC is a consensus-based forum of four interest groups, to achieve the 
above-mentioned objectives. The members are the state, the economy i.e. business, the labour 
unions and the community. 
According to Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, the strength of COSA TU prior to, and during, 
South Africa's political transition in the early nineties created a unique opportunity to lever 
the National Party government and business to develop and implement consensus-based 
policies to restructure the automobile and textile sectors. In both industries, the three parties 
agreed to progressively reduce tariffs and integrate South African industry into the global 
economy (Adler, 2000: 101). 
Mark Anstey has compared the South African and German labour relations systems and 
comes to the conclusion that the new industrial relations in developed countries has demanded 
a shift from wealth extractive historically-based adversarial bargaining to a future-oriented, 
wealth-creative process; a shift from power based bargaining to information-driven problem-
solving; and from the distance of centralised collective bargaining forum to the enterprise and 
the workstation. It might be argued that these shifts in developed countries reflect very 
different social and economic conditions to developing counties, such as South Africa, but in 
the context of a global economy such isolationist analysis is unhelpful (Anstey: 1995, 31 ). 
The main question is whether these shifts in industrial relations took place in South Africa. 
Jeremy Baskins elaborates the problems the unions have with corporatism: "Co-operation 
with capital is not always easy for labour, and may conflict with the labour movement's own 
broader agenda for social change. For this reason unionists tend to shy away from the term 
'corporatism', as they want to influence state policy but don't want to be accused of a cosy 
relationship with capital" (Baskin, 2000: 4 7). 
He continues: "COSATU's alliance with the ANC has frequently been seen as an indication 
that it may become beholden to an ANC-led government, despite its independent, militant 
past. It would be foolish to deny party influence on the labour movement; largely unavoidable 
in any democratic process" (Baskin, 2000: 48). It is questionable whether in a functionally 
differentiated, pluralistic state like South Africa two simultaneous alliances between the state, 
labour and business on the one hand and the ANC/COSATU/SACP on the other hand can be 
maintained. 
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Baskin mentions one major problem that occurred during the democratic transformation 
towards corporatism: "First, organised labour has lost significant layers of leadership to 
government, political office and the corporate sector. Often labelled the 'brain drain', this has 
seriously dented the pool of skills and experience developed over the years of struggle" 
(Baskin, 2000: 48). 
Besides the special problem of the 'brain drain', another problem seems to be the resistance of 
trade unionists and managers to change. Anstey mentions in this connection, in an elaboration 
of the American labour relation system: "However, the overall shape of collective bargaining 
remained much the same - institutionalised adversarialism within defined parameters around 
wages and rules. In this context, early worker participation initiatives ran against tradition and 
it was often trade union leaders and industrial relation managers who were the architects of 
resistance to change" (Anstey, 1995: 7). Maller states in that connection that the shop 
stewards at VWSA did not report back from workplace forums where they met with 
management (Maller, 1992: 98). 
I finish this section with a quote form Webster and Adler: "Corporatism ultimately depends 
on the capacity of the labour movement to represent its members, to reach and enforce 
agreements with capital and the state. This requires that leaders have the capacity both to 
mobilise their members in certain circumstances and restrain them in others. The dilemma of 
leadership in this context is to respond to the immediate needs of workers while simul-
taneously leading them towards a longer term vision" (Adler, 2000: 13). In the case at 
Volkswagen I found shop stewards not coping with such a 'dilemma', they were caught up in 
the old South Africa. B.K. Smith mentioned in an interview that the 13 shop stewards "did not 
come to terms with the new democratic South Africa" (Smith, interview, 2002). 
2.4.3 The Market 
When it comes to the market I want to concentrate on the product and its position on the 
market. The VW Golf (A4 platform) has a top position on the international automobile market 
and since its launch it is the best selling compact class car in Germany. Volkswagen has been 
the biggest car producer in Europe and in Africa since 2000. 
What was the meaning of the A4 export agreement to the company and the employees? 
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• VWSA would become the biggest vehicle producer in South Africa; 
• Job security for the 400 direct employees who were 'surplus' to the local market needs 
in I998 and others who would have become 'surplus' in I999; 1 
• The recruitment by VWSA of approximately I 000 additional direct employees m 
I998/99; 
• The creation of large a number of supporting jobs in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage 
area, e.g., at suppliers, harbour, etc.; 
• The opportunity for employees to receive training in world class production tech-
niques as are applied in the best automobile plants in the world; 
• The investment of RI60 million in the local supply industry in this region, which 
would create jobs; 
• Integration into the worldwide VW supply chain, which will help to protect the 
company from fluctuations in the local vehicle market which threaten jobs; 
• If quality, schedules, cost and delivery targets are met on this project, it could open the 
door for additional large export orders (A4 export agreement, I998: I). 
The Golf in South Africa is produced for the British and South African market. The volume of 
the export contract is estimated at 12% of the total South African export turnover (Berliner 
Morgenpost 2000: Feb 7). 
Compared with other countries South Africa can offer strategic advantages. I describe it as a 
niche market that the companies are exploiting. This form of production needed to be 
streamlined from a 'Fordist' to a more 'Toyotist' form of production. 
The National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) 
describes some of the competitive advantages the South African automobile manufacturers 
have at a global level: 
• A world-beating cost ability on short runs; 
• Very competitive tooling costs. For tooling under a foot (30cm), South African costs 
are typically half of European costs, for the same quality. This is largely because of 
the lower labour rates; 
1 This section is quoted from the A4 export agreement - "surplus of 400 employees" was the terminology 
chosen by NUM SA and VWSA. 
23 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• A high degree of manufacturing flexibility; 
• Access to the Southern Hemisphere. Transport costs are distance-related and there will 
be some markets that are closer to South Africa; 
• Right hand drive. (NAAMSA, 2002, web) 
2.4.4 The form of production 
Twice in the last century the automobile has changed our most fundamental ideas on how we 
make things. How we make things dictates not only how we work but also what we buy, how 
we think, and the way we live (Womack, 1990: 11 ). 
At the beginning of the 201h century, Henry Ford and General Motors' Alfred Sloan moved 
world manufacture from centuries of craft production - led by European firms - into the age 
of mass production. As a result, the United States soon dominated the global economy 
(Womack, 1990: 11). 
After World War 11, Eiji Toyody and Taiichi Ohno at the Toyota Motor Company in Japan 
pioneered the concept of 'lean production'. The rise of Japan to its current economic pre-
eminence quickly followed, as other Japanese companies and industries copied this remark-
able system (Womack, 1990: 11 ). 
Fordism as Gramsci defined it, refers to a form of productive organisation thought to be 
typical of advanced capitalism and exemplified by Henry Ford's system of mass automobile 
production. This allied labour management according to the principles of scientific 
management (Taylorism) with a wider reorganisation of production and marketing, involving 
a moving assembly line, standardised outputs, and demand stimulation by a combination of 
low prices, high wages, advertising, and consumer credit. 
Following the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, with associated changes in the social 
and technical organisation of production and the alleged coming of Bell's post industrial 
society, some sociologists suggested that Fordism was in its terminal crisis, being succeeded 
by 'post-Fordism' or 'Toyotism', based on so-called flexible production systems (Marshall, 
1998: 235). 
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It is argued that increasing national and international competition, i.e. globalisation, is forcing 
greater flexibility on firms in order to respond more quickly to changes in the product market. 
This includes greater flexibility in employment level (numerical flexibility), job tasks and 
skills (functional flexibility), and payment systems (financial flexibility) (Marshall, 1998: 
232). 
The main indicators for 'post-Fordist' flexible production systems are group work, just-in-
time production, integrated production processes, flat communication hierarchies, increased 
communication, and the shift from a top-down Fordist organisation strategy towards a 
bottom-up organisational strategy. This way of production was pioneered at the Toyota Motor 
Company in Japan and has also been described as 'Toyotist'. The following table indicates the 
main shifts from the Fordist to the Toyotist production paradigm. 
Table I The shift from Fordism to Toyotlsm 
Mass production 
Fordism Production Philosophy 
Producer push 
"Any colour provided is 
black" 
Volumes 
Quality "good enough" 
Buffers at every production 
Step to avoid disruption 
Product cost + desired profit = 
pnce 
Taylorism 
External job design 
Technological Control 
Job fragmentation 
Repetitive work 
Deskilling 
Individualised incentives 
Work Organisation 
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Lean Production 
Toyotism 
Consumer pull 
Customer choice 
Zero defect 
Low waste 
Continuous improvement 
Reduced inventories 
Rapid product development 
Speed in production 
Price - product cost = profit 
Democratic Taylorism? 
Extended decision making 
Team controls 
Meaningful task variation 
Multi skilling 
Team incentives 
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Management 
Authority Decentralised controls 
Hierarchies Flatter organisations 
Bureaucracy Managers as resources 
Spans of control Participation 
Rigid & procedural Flexibilities 
Extractive/distributive Industrial Relations Wealth creative 
Constitutional Participative 
Seniority Skills based 
Extensive work rules Flexibility 
Procedural rigidity Education and training 
Adversarial Cooperative 
Extractive/distributive Wealth creative 
(Source: Anstey, 1995: 11) 
Anstey states that the lean or Toyotist production has been arguably the most successful in 
enabling enterprises to remain competitive in saturated global markets in which manufactures 
have been obliged to shift from a producer-push philosophy to one of a consumer pull 
character in which a choosy consumer with a wide choice is the critical player (Anstey, 1995: 
10). 
2.4.5 The South African automobile industry in the post apartheid era 
Business Day reported that South Africa's motor industry was projecting exports of 60 000 
built-up vehicles in 2000 and was projecting to export as many as 200 000 units by 2002-03. 
(Business Day 2000: Sep 15). 
At a parliamentary media briefing the minister of trade an industry, Alec Erwin, said this 
sector, together with clothing and textile and the stainless steel industries, had turned the 
corner and was showing real prospects for growth (Business Day, 2000: Sep.15). 
Erwin reported that the total motor industry exports in Rand value terms had risen by 46,5% 
from 1998 to 2000, an average yearly rate of increase of 3 7% since 1995, when the motor 
industry development programme (MIDP) was introduced. (Business Day, 2000: Sep.l5). 
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The growth in motor component exports, which showed an annual increase of 31% from 1995 
to last year, was expected to continue, reaching a projected total of R 11 bn in 2000 compared 
to R9, 67bn in 1999 and R7, 9bn in 1998 (Business Day, 2000: Sep.15). 
Looking at the increase in the total export production of the SA motor industry, as well as the 
motor component industry, I only can conclude that the motor industry is 'booming' or as one 
author described it, "catching up from behind" (Nordas, 1996: 715). 
Hans-Christian Maergner, the Managing Director of VWSA mentioned: "Our export of 30 
000 Golfs to Europe has allowed us to rejoin the global vehicle and component supply 
network and benefited SA in terms of foreign exchange earnings and the transfer of skills and 
technology" (Business Day: 2001, Aug 17). Graph 2 shows the number of cars produced for 
export from SA. 
Fig 2: Passenger cars exported from South Africa between 1995-2001 
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(Source: NAACAM, 2002, web) 
Besides the A4 export agreement, VWSA was also awarded a R 1. 7 billion contract for 
catalytic converters. "These three catalytic converter contracts are significant in that they form 
part of an overall strategy which will see the announcement of additional contracts for engine 
components, alloy wheels, parts and accessories replacement parts in the near future" 
(Business Day: 2001, Aug 17). 
The newspaper also reported that: "There had been a growing trend for companies to export 
great volumes of catalytic converter components because of the benefits derived in terms of 
government's motor industry development programme. Credits are accumulated for volumes 
of components exported. Volkswagen expects to use export rebates earned to offset the import 
27 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
charges for bringing some of its low-volume, fully built-up units to SA, including the new 
Audi range and other products" (Business Day: Aug 17, 2001 ). The MIPD led to the reduction 
of import duties and local producers are allowed to import some components duty free and 
may reduce import duties on other components by exporting cars or components (Adler, 
2000: 110). 
The aim of the MIPD is to integrate the South African automobile and components industry 
into the global production chains of the mother companies. The Industrial Developments 
Consultants (INDEVCO), a South African Consultant company, states in this connection: 
"The South African Government introduced the Motor Industry Development Programme on 
1 September 1995 aimed at regulating the motor industry in South Africa and to promote 
exports through the issue of Import Rebate Credit Certificates. The results of this programme, 
which have gained the interest and attention of global players, have been remarkable, with 
exports rocketing from nothing some five years ago to R 18 billion in 2000/2001" 
(INDEVCO, 2002, web). 
The situation of the automotive industry at the beginning of the 1990s was a completely 
different one, as the report on the industrial strategy project (ISP) states: "Had South Africa to 
grow at the same rate as the NICs after the mid 1970s, our GNP per capita would now have 
been over $7250 as opposed to its present level of little over $2500. While such 
counterfactuals are to be treated with caution, they do indicate the magnitude of economic 
opportunities lost" (Joffe, 1995: 4). 
The objectives of the ISP were to create employment, increase investment, raise productivity 
and improve trade performance. There were different strategies to achieve these goals. In the 
case of VWSA I want to emphasises the "specialisation: moving up the value chain" 
approach. 
The ISP was commissioned in the late 1980s by COSA TU to analyse the impact of sanctions 
on the South African economy. John Gomomo, ex Volkswagen shop steward and president of 
COSA TU stated: "The research revealed that the crisis of the South African economy was 
rooted in the policies of the apartheid era and our commission to the economists was trans-
formed into a full scale critique of the economics of apartheid. A key consequence of the 
failures of apartheid's social and economic policies was its unproductive manufacturing 
sector" (Joffe, 1995: 4). 
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"While auto plants in other developing countries became increasingly integrated into the 
global operations of multinational firms from the 1970s, the South African industry remained 
internationally isolated and developed behind a protective tariff wall" (Adler, 2000:1 08). 
One strategy by the state, labour and business to counter these developments in the manu-
facturing sector was to open the economy to international competition. Hirschsohn, Godfrey 
and Maree mention in this connection: "The state hopes this strategy of steadily reducing 
tariff protection and progressively infusing more intense international competition will 
improve efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. Tariff protection, which was reduced 
from 115% to 80% in 1994 to 54% in 1998, will decline to 40% by 2002 - a lower level at a 
faster rate than required under South Africa's GATT commitments" (Adler, 2000:1 08). 
To compete domestically and internationally the companies have to restructure their 
production techniques. From a more Fordist type of production to a more Toyotist or Japanese 
production style. Mr. Maergner the MD of VWSA, mentions in this connection: "The world 
does not wait for South Africa anymore. We have to transform quickly to stay competitive" 
(Berliner Morgenpost: 1998, May 19). 
Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree interviewed B.K. Smith., the Human Resource Manager at 
VWSA, and state in this connection: "Volkswagen management admits that the industry was 
unprepared for the major cultural shift required to move from a low-wage strategy towards a 
system founded on equity and skilled workforce" (Adler, 2000: 113). A skilled workforce is 
an integral part of a T oyotist production system. The workers need to have multiple skills to 
react to the changes in the production process more quickly to become more 'flexible'. 
2.5 Trust 
A strong tradition in sociology argues that stable collective life must be based on more than 
mere calculations of self-interest and that, even in a business situation, an element of trust is 
essential. Emile Durkheim's celebrated phrase that "in a contract not everything is 
contractual" states this position very nicely. Trust can be defined as "confidence in the 
reliability of a person or system" (Marshall, 1998: 674). However there are also different 
definitions of trust. Niklas Luhmann for example defined trust as "the reduction of decision 
options" (Luhmann, 1968: 21 ). 
Francis Fukuyama in his book "Trust - The social Virtues and the creation of Prosperity" 
gives several examples of how trust has had implications on the economic performance of a 
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company. "In the Toyota Motor Company's assembly plant, any of the thousands of assembly 
line workers who work there can bring the entire plant to a halt by pulling on a cord at his or 
her workstation. They seldom do so. By contrast, workers at the great Ford Auto plants like 
Highland Park or River Rouge - plants that virtually defined the nature of modern production 
for three generations - were never trusted with this kind of power. Today, Ford workers, 
having adopted Japanese techniques, are trusted with similar powers, and have greater control 
over their workplace and machines" (Fukuyama, 1995: 5). 
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I constantly collected newspaper and intemet articles dealing with the conflict in Uitenhage 
and its wider environment. By 2002 I had collected about 80 newspaper articles dealing with 
the conflict in Uitenhage. During 2000 and 2001 I daily scanned the South African media and 
Laboumet.de homepage for new articles on the conflict. An observation of second order, as 
Luhmann would describe it, or simply secondary source analyses. I scanned Business Day, 
The P.E. Herald, Mail & Guardian, The Cape Argus, Der Spiegel (a German news magazine) 
and the Taz (a Berlin daily). 
The observations of first order were the visits and interviews with representatives involved. I 
tried to gather as much information as possible and later analysed and reduced it in the light of 
the literature discussed and the above-mentioned research questions. 
But why did I conduct this research? Firstly, because I wanted to find out what was 'behind' 
the happenings in Uitenhage- was it 'just another globalisation case', or were there also other 
reasons for the emergence of the conflict? Further, to explain and explore the conflict I tried 
to test the theory of social conflict on that particular real case. I will review this theory later in 
this thesis. What role does the institutionalisation of social conflict play regarding 
development, and is there a relationship between social conflict and development? Therefore 
Simmel's, Coser's and Dahrendorfs contributions to the theory of social conflict, are applied 
to the social conflict at VWSA in Uitenhage. 
Why did the conflict during 1999 and 2000 evolve? And what kind of explanations do the 
theory and literature give us? Therefore one aim of the thesis can be described as theory-
testing. Is it appropriate to characterize this particular social conflict as one that has become 
institutionalised? 
Does social conflict in Uitenhage help in building up associations, how big is it's impact on 
the 'community', and what can it explain to us in terms of a new pluralistic and democratic 
South Africa. I will apply the literature presented in chapter three to this conflict, and ask 
whether this conflict was functional or dysfunctional. Did it become integrated into existing 
institutions or not, and did it help in building new ones? 
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3.2 The case study 
For this research I decided to use the case study research method. Therefore I looked at this 
special conflict case at VWSA. Case studies in general are of a more explorative character, a 
field of social reality becomes explored and described to analyse and conceptualise it 
afterwards in the light of the collected data and empirical material. 
The method used to assemble information is determined in part by the ease of access and 
whether the study is accepted by the subjects. Volkswagen denied access during the 
arbitration process and therefore I had to use secondary information related to the company. 
In 2002 the company shared insights on the conflict with me and gave me the opportunity to 
interview Mr. B.K. Smith and Mr. A. Hunneyball, human resource managers at the company. 
The dismissed workers and unions involved were generally very helpful in supplying me with 
information. 
A list of interview partners appears after the bibliography. 
One problem during the first arbitration session was the malfunctioning sound system in the 
Uitenhage Town Hall; to follow the first cross-examinations acoustically was very difficult. 
During the second arbitration session these problems were solved, as the arbitration took 
place in the Uitenhage sports hall with a 'state of the art' sound system. 
As mentioned above I undertook participant observation at several demonstrations, court and 
arbitration sessions, and I further undertook unstructured interviews with key informants. 
Besides the media articles, I analysed documentary evidence i.e. the A4 export agreement, the 
final judgment from the labour appeal court as well as the CCMA arbitration award. I 
collected all the data and empirical material and then later analysed it in terms of the theory 
and literature. The literature and theory are reviewed in the chapter three of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
The Context of the Strike 
Introduction 
Before I start with a description of the strikes in 1999 and 2000 and its evolution, I want to 
give a socio-economic overview of Uitenhage followed by a description of the Volkswagen 
Company. 
After this I proceed with the different interest groups and the CCMA. Finally I gtve a 
summary of the happenings during the strike. 
4.1 Uitenhage: a socio-economic profile 
In 1996, 38 039 people were employed m Uitenhage whereas 79 431 people were 
unemployed. At the time, the unemployment rate was approximately 50%. The composition 
ofthe different population groups in the community in 1996 was as follows: 
T bl 2 P I . G a e opu at10n . U' h roups m 1ten age 
Population Group Number 
African/Black 72 835 
Coloured 47 582 
Indian! Asian I 035 
White 21 602 
TOTAL 143 054 
(Source: Statistics South Afnca Census 1996) 
Table 3: Sector Em lo ment Uitenha e 
Primar Secondar Tertiar Total 
1365 12156 20450 33971 
4.01% 35.78% 60.18% 100% 
(Source: Statistics South Africa Census 1996) 
In 1996 Uitenhage was an industrial town with a secondary sector employment rate of 
35.78%. In other words, of all economically active people almost 36% were employed in the 
industrial sector. 
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Volkswagen was one of the major employers in Uitenhage in I996 when about 6000 people 
were employed at Volkswagen South Africa. 
In I996 the unemployment rate in the Eastern Cape stood at 48.5% - the highest rate in the 
country (Statistics South Africa, Census I996). In I992 Judy Maller described the socio-
economic situation as follows: "According to official statistics there were 120 000 homeless 
families and one third of the total African population lived in shacks. It was reported that in 
Uitenhage itself, only 25% of families in Langa 'live in proper brick houses' and most 
families are poverty-stricken and cannot afford new houses being built for them in Kwano-
buhle. During 1985, an unemployment rate over 60% was estimated by the Labour Monitor-
ing Group" (Maller,I992: 93). 
"Black workers help to support large family networks, experience ongoing accommodation 
shortages and are plagued with all social problems associated with high levels of impoverish-
ment such as widespread alcoholism, ill-health, and low levels of formal education." (Maller, 
1992: 93). In 2000 and 2001 it appeared, from simple observation, that the high levels of im-
poverishment persisted. 
The Census Data also indicates that the Uitenhage population is very young. The mean age of 
the Uitenhage inhabitant is only 27 years (Census SA, I996). It further shows that the young 
age cohort from 0-9 years is smaller than the I O-I4 year old age cohort. Whereby the age 
cohort of the I O-I4 year old builds the turning point. There are fewer children in the 0-4 
cohort and in the 5 - 9 cohort, than in the I 0 - I4 year old age cohort. This indicates that there 
is a high dependency on the 'bread winners' in the area. 
4.2 Context: the political 'tradition' of the Eastern Cape 
In general, a political tradition of conflict in the Eastern Cape falls into three periods. The first 
period stretches from 1652 until 1977, the second period from 1977 until 1990 and the third 
period from 1990 until the present. 
During the first period it was forbidden for the majority of South African workers to organise 
themselves in labour unions and articulate their demands. B. J. Vorster's position neatly 
illustrates the first as well as the second period: "It is true that there are blacks working for us. 
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They will continue to work for us for generations, in spite of the ideal we have to separate 
them completely. Surely we all know that. .. The fact of the matter is this: We need them, 
because they work for us ... but the fact that they work for us can never- if one accepts this as 
one's own criterion one will be signing its own death sentence right now - entitle them to 
claim political rights. Not now, not in the future. It makes no difference whether they are here 
with any degree of permanency or not. .. under no circumstances can we grant them those 
political rights in our territory neither now or never" (Okwui, 1998: 113). 
The second period started with the Wiehahn Commission reports that recognised and recom-
mended that black unions be recognized - to exercise some kind of control over them. The 
idea was to integrate African organised labour into the structures and institutions of the South 
African society. 
The hope was to effect a change within the system rather than a change of the system. It has 
also been described as an attempt to calm the system. The strike activities in the 1980s 
showed that this approach was not successful from the state's point of view, but it definitely 
helped organised labour to organise and structure itself. The period of the 1980s in Uitenhage 
and Port Elisabeth has been described as "workers' war" - strikes became politically 
motivated and the enemy was clear- the apartheid regime. 
Maller mentions in this connection that: "Many of the strikes acquired overtly political over-
tones - 1989 was a year of sustained political activity on the part of the union movement and 
United Democratic Front and African National Congress as well as the Pan African Congress. 
These organisations had strong bases in the townships around Uitenhage and political tensions 
often entered the company premises. On one occasion workers carried mock-AK47s through 
the plant. Marches and toyi-toying took place regularly during lunch hours" (Maller, 1992: 
125). 
In 1989, Brian Smith, the human resource director of VWSA attempted to periodise the 
development of industrial relations at the company in the following way: 
• Prior to 1979: management dominance; 
• 1980-1986: intense conflict; 
• 1986-1987: institutionalisation of conflict. 
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He did add the qualification that despite this institutionalisation, there was still potential for 
conflict. This insight was underpinned by more conflict and disruption than VWSA had 
experienced previously (Maller, 1992: 99). 
The current period can be described as a period towards the democratisation of the workplace. 
The wildcat strike at VWSA is an indication of how slow it is for the whole system to change 
from closed to open, or from militant to democratic. 
The strike also shows how hard it is for partners in a coalition to find an own identity. After 
the struggle the whole resistance movement starts to become differentiated and some 
coalitions start to become 'irrational' for the parties involved, conflicts 'within' the specific 
system become apparent to the public sphere. 
Further, the attitudes towards democracy do not evolve overnight. The old attitudes form the 
basis on which the new democratic attitudes have to be erected. Maller cites a union member 
who illustrates his approach to workplace democracy at the beginning of the 1990s: "If we 
have sent the shop stewards to submit our demands to management and we are not satisfied 
about the response, we ask our part-time shop steward to call a general meeting. If our 
problem is not solved we decide to go on strike. If others refuse to join the strike, we assault 
them." (Maller, 1992: 121 ). This also happened in 1999 and 2000. The 13 recalcitrant shop 
stewards simply ignored the NUMSA leadership and its attempts to restore discipline. 
Also important is the 'brain drain' that the unions have experienced since the transformation 
to democracy. Now the unions had to cope with a situation that was more complex than it 
used to be. The company VWSA was not the 'evil white enemy' anymore and at the same 
time NUMSA had to compensate for their loss of experienced leadership. For example, John 
Gomomo, an experienced shop steward at VWSA, went to Johannesburg and embarked on a 
political career and became COSA TU president. 
For many shop stewards, the enemy was not clear anymore. Was it the union, the state, or the 
company? The company did not actively help the informal struggle structures to arrive in the 
democratic post-apartheid South Africa. The union was too weak to execute the necessary 
authority at the plant. 
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Jim Nodwangu described the 'traditional' approach of workers towards the umon and 
management in the following way: "Workers used intimidatory tactics which were associated 
with VW struggles which were at the centre of the struggle in Uitenhage in the 1980s. These 
kinds of tactics in these times with a new LRA were inappropriate." (F orrest, 2000: 16). They 
may have been inappropriate, but they became part of the problem at VWSA in 1999 and 
2000. 
4.3 Parties to the conflict 
4.3.1 The company Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA) 
Volkswagen of South Africa is set on the outskirts of the industrial town of Uitenhage, just 35 
kilometres from Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape Province. The company was established in 
1951 as the South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors (SAMAD). Judy Maller 
described why the Volkswagen group chose Uitenhage for its production site in 1951: 
"Uitenhage, a small town which grew as a industrial centre in the post-war period, was a 
particularly appropriate site for the VW plant. .. with so many parts coming from the parent 
company in Germany, the plant's proximity to the harbour town of Port Elisabeth was 
significant. In addition, an industrial infrastructure already existed in Uitenhage by 1948, 
primarily in the form of railway workshops. These would provide a supply of skilled white 
workers to the VWSA plant. Furthermore, Goodyear had set up its tyre manufacturing plant 
during the war years and there was an embryonic textile sector, including the Veldspun 
factory." (Maller, 1992: 91). 
VWSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Volkswagen AG. According to the company "this 
ensures that it follows the world-wide quality set by the parent company". It also enables 
VWSA to stay abreast of technological developments in motor manufacturing. 
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Fig 3: Volume of cars produced by company in South Africa. 
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Graph 3, above, shows that VWSA is the biggest car producer in South Africa. This leading 
position evolved after the A4 export agreement. In 2000 for the first time VWSA produced 
more cars domestically than its biggest competitor, Toyota. The company also achieved great 
success on the local market with the introduction of the Citi Chico in April 1995. Its success 
in the highly competitive global market is further enhanced by the export of body and engine 
parts and catalytic converters to countries like Argentina, Spain, Belgium and Germany, as 
well as large numbers of built-up units to overseas markets. 
The company argues: "Innovative technology, quality, economy and motoring enjoyment are 
the foundations of the success which makes the Volkswagen Group the fourth largest car 
manufacturer in the world and Number One in Europe" (VWSA, 2000, web). 
VWSA is the largest foreign employer in South Africa and directly employs 5 200 workers 
(Smith, interview, 2002). The Volkswagen family contains more than 2 500 suppliers and a 
national network of 210 dealerships (VWSA, 2000, web). 
To ensure that all VWSA employees receive relevant development opportunities, extensive 
education and training opportunities exist, ranging from basic literacy and skills training, to 
assistance with tertiary education. These already started at the beginning of the 1990s. 
"VWSA is committed to enhancing the communities in which its employees live. The VW 
Community Trust was established in 1989, specifically to assist communities in their develop-
ment. A joint effort by VWSA employees in 1987 resulted in the accumulation of savings of 
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R7 million from the Company's operating costs, which was paid into the Trust when it was 
formally established. The Trust is jointly run by a Board of Trustees, consisting of represen-
tatives of VWSA Management, the Union, employees, local authorities and the community." 
(VWSA, 2000, web). 
VWSA also supports the Government's Reconstruction and Development Programme 
financially. Together with VWAG it has established The Volkswagen International Training 
and Development Programme for the development of young leaders through overseas 
training. According to the company, a project has been launched to provide affordable 
housing for employees (Smith, interview, 2002). 
VWSA was an official sponsor of the South African Olympic Team for the 2000 Olympic 
Games. Volkswagen also supports the National Soccer team by being the official transport 
provider to Bafana Bafana. 
Every car that comes off the assembly lines at VWSA has, as the main ingredient, a company-
wide commitment to the value of quality. Each step in the production process focuses on 
producing cars of exceptional quality. 
4.3.1.1 Industrial Relations at VWSA 
Under the management of Peter Searle in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the company 
actively tried to promote a culture of "the Volkswagen family" to overcome the adversarial 
labour relations that were characterised by conflict and strikes. The main participatory struc-
tures in 1994 were a business unit committee, a plant committee, a negotiating committee, 
working groups, joint union management committee (JUMEC), strategic union management 
workshops, building meetings, general meetings, profit sharing, and a community trust fund. 
After 1995, JUMEC became the Work Place Forum. It was attended by directors, full-time 
shop stewards, and senior trade union officials. It was held quarterly to disclose information 
and discuss strategic issues. 
Strategic union management workshops were convened when necessary by either party to 
discuss strategic and policy matters. At the beginning of the 1990s, for example, a delegation 
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from the German labour union came to discuss the notion of eo-determination with the shop 
stewards (Hunneyball, interview, 2002). 
Another example for participatory structures was the General Meetings. They were held 
quarterly during paid working time. Part of the meetings was an hour-long address by the 
Managing Director and three hours for union business. There is also a profit-sharing scheme, 
i.e. an end of year bonus. 
The community trust fund is set up by the company to promote community development. 
Representatives of management only serve in an advisory capacity. 
However, there were severe problems with overcoming the adversarial labour relations at the 
company. Maller states in this connection: "Stewards identified their role primarily in political 
terms, specifically providing a leadership function in community struggles and, more 
generally, contributing to the building of a working class leadership." (Maller, 1992: 136). 
Another problem highlighted by Maller has to do with worker participation and JUMEC: 
"98% of worker respondents stated that they never received a report-back from shop stewards 
on JUMEC meetings. This was in stark contrast to the 85% of respondents who received 
regular report-backs from shop stewards about other issues ... This may reflect the union's 
ambivalence about participation in these structures, and indicates a serious breach of 
otherwise very democratic report back structures." (Maller, 1992: 133). 
Maller concludes that: "The significance of the VWSA case study lies essentially in the 
union's innovative approach to participative management: it has not adopted a strategy of 
refusal and boycotted all forms of participation; it has also not succumbed to incorporation 
because it remains an independent locus of power based on strong shop floor unionism. 
Instead it is pioneering a third route which combines participation with independent worker 
representation in an attempt to shift permanently the frontier of control and ensure that 
workers' interests are represented in the formation of company policy." (Mall er, 1992: 14 7). 
During my visit to VWSA, I got the impression that worker participation at the plant was very 
minimal, if non-existent. What I saw was only shop steward participation and the increased 
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power position of shop stewards. Mr. Smith and Mr. Hunneyball mentioned that there was no 
direct worker participation apart from the General Meeting. 
What I see as central at VWSA is that power was ceded not to workers but to their shop 
stewards, and Judy Maller's case study also gives several indications of this. So I would argue 
that there was "embryonic shop steward participation" and not "embryonic participation" 
(Maller, 1992: 146). However, this was embryonic shop steward participation in policy 
matters, not direct worker participation. This empowered the already powerful shop steward 
even more. 
Smith mentioned in this connection: "The company can not engage with each and every 
individual or grouping" (Smith, interview, 2002), and Hunneyball elaborated that there was 
"no direct worker participation" (Hunneyball, interview, 2002); therefore, when one keeps the 
shift from Fordism to Toyotism in mind, and then one hears these two statements, one comes 
to the conclusion that the strategy of active worker involvement was not even contemplated. 
4.3.2 The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) 
NUMSA was formed in May 1987, emerging from four different unions. The Metal and 
Allied Workers Union (MAWU), the Motor Industry Combined Workers Union (MICWU), 
the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAA WU) and finally the United Metal, 
Mining and Allied Workers of South Africa (UMMAWOSA). 
Two different COSA TU unions also gave their metal members to NUMSA: GA WU (General 
and Allied Workers Union) and TGWU (Transport and General Workers Union) (Baskin, 
1991: 33). Unionisation in the Eastern Cape began on a racially divided basis with the 
organisation of Coloured workers in the motor and components industry into the National 
union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA) from 1967 
onwards. The racial separation was based in the legacy of apartheid and the tradition of 
parallel unions for different population groups in the Trade Union Council of South Africa 
(TUCSA), ofwhich NUMARWOSA was part between 1971 and 1976. 
During the 1970s African workers were starting to organise themselves in the United Auto-
mobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union (UA W). The UAW had its origins in 1971 when 
the leadership in the NUMAROSA decided to co-operate with African Workers in the 
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industrial council. The promotion of non-racialism made NUMR WOSA a key actor during 
the formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions, a non-racial federation of 
industrial trade unions in 1979. 
These initiatives established a tradition of non-racial trade unionism at VWSA which formed 
the backbone of its organisational strength. NUMARWOSA had also developed a strong 
structure of shop floor representation. This provided a basis for the strong shop floor tradition 
which the motor union would adopt as its defining characteristic. The UAW remained 
essentially an 'independent parallel union' ofNUMARWOSA, with very close links. 
Freddie Sauls, general secretary of NUMAR WOSA, served as technical adviser to the UW A. 
Mr. Sauls also attended the arbitration sessions in Uitenhage and delivered background infor-
mation to the German labour unionists who also attended the arbitration session. He described 
himself as being a "Marxist-Leninist" - which gave me some indication from which ideo-
logical background the union movement in Eastern Cape came. 
Shop steward structures had developed by the late 1970s at VWSA (Maller, 1992: 94). The 
watershed industrial action that established the strength of the union at VWSA was the strike 
wave of 1979-1980 which swept the Port Elisabeth-Uitenhage region, and was led by 
organised workers at Ford and VWSA. Both Coloured and African workers at VWSA went 
out on strike and their action was precipitated a general strike in the city (Maller, 1992: 95). 
The general strike, which lasted three weeks, was followed by a period of 'guerrilla struggle' 
involving short stoppages at the VWSA plant. 
This led to the establishment of very strong shop floor structures, major wage gains and the 
conclusion of formal agreements. These strong shop floor structures are essential for 
understanding what happened at VWSA during the 1999 and 2000 strikes. 
The strike in the early 1980s also marked the beginnings of formal non-racial unionism in the 
motor industry with the amalgamation of NUMARWOSA, UAW and the Western Province 
Motor Assembly Workers Union into the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union 
(NAAWU). This legacy created a precedent for the emergence of strong shop steward 
structures at VWSA, a vital component of which was the presence of eight full time shop 
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stewards. The growth of shop steward structures provided the basis for increased union 
strength (Maller, 1992: 97). 
At the end of the 1980s John Gomomo COSA TU President, observed that: "There is a danger 
of full time stewards losing contact with the workers. We combat this by keeping in close 
touch with the factory. The plant is demarcated and part-time shop stewards in an area report 
daily to one full time shop steward." (Maller, 1992: 97). 
On a quarterly basis full-time shop stewards reported back to the general membership. These 
general meetings are an ongoing feature of unionism at VWSA, and play an ambivalent role 
in the development of union democracy: on the one hand they provide opportunities for 
participation in decisions by ordinary members, and on the other hand they allow for the 
domination of decision-making by vociferous and well-organised sub-groupings within the 
union. The happenings during 1999 and 2000, and the conflict between the 13 shop stewards 
and the union, are a good example that such domination was problematic during times of 
transformation - when leadership was in a deep crisis. 
However, by 1983 the union and company were feeling the major recession in the industry 
that led to retrenchments. Generally the period of the 1980s can be described as a period of 
ongoing and intense conflict that was eventually subdued by the imposition of two states of 
emergency and heavy-handed police action which affected the Uitenhage community 
intimately, especially the Langa massacre when the police opened fire on a funeral march. 
Between September 1984 and March 1985, government figures showed 10 000 arrested, 217 
killed and 751 injured nationwide. (Maller, 1992: 98). 
By 1986 this approach by the state gave rise to a period of relatively peaceful industrial 
relations at VWSA which lasted until 1989 when once again intense conflict arose between 
management and the union (Maller, 1992: 98). 
After the democratic transformation new problems and possibilities emerged for NUMSA. 
The biggest problem was the leadership crisis at VWSA. John Gomomo and others left the 
structures in Uitenhage and made careers either in political organisations or in private 
business. Baskin mentions one major problem that occurred during the democratic trans-
formation: "First, organised labour has lost significant layers of leadership to government, 
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political office and the corporate sector. Often labelled the 'brain-drain', this has seriously 
dented the pool of skills and experience developed over the years of struggle (Baskin: 2000, 
48). Hunneyball also mentioned this problem at VWSA, so the weaker leadership had to 
communicate more complex approaches to management, and that finally resulted in the 
stepping down of the 18 loyal NUM SA shop stewards. 
There was intense conflict over issues of the National Bargaining Forum in 1989 and 1994. 
During 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 there was what Hunneyball described as "the usual un-
procedural industrial actions" i.e. small wildcat strikes, but in contrast to the happenings in 
2000, no workers were dismissed. 
In 1999 it became apparent that there was an ideological split within NUMSA at VWSA. 
Some shop stewards started to criticise and intimidate other shop stewards at the plant and 
accused them of "being in bed with management", because the majority of shop stewards had 
agreed to the A4 export agreement. lrvine Jim, shop steward at VWSA at the time, mentions 
self-critically in this connection: "The agreement was not perfect but in a capitalist environ-
ment it was the best we could do to ensure creation of jobs in a sea of unemployment in the 
area" (Forrest, 2000: 14). 
Dumisan Ntuli, NUMSA information officer, mentioned during an interview I conducted with 
him that: "We had several meetings with them, but they started to build their own structures at 
the company and at a regional meeting where shop stewards from all of the Eastern Cape 
attended - this structure then decided to suspend these shop stewards." (Ntuli, interview, 
2002). So the union tried to discipline the 13 shop stewards but without any success. 
Forrest tries to excuse this 'faux pas' with the following statement: "The delay in dealing with 
the lndlu yeengwevu opposition may have partly to do with the NUMSA tradition of allowing 
a wide range of opinions and political views within the organisation. That has been one of the 
union's strengths." (Forrest, 2000: 20). The union had over a year to bring the dissident shop 
stewards 'on board', and there were attempts by union leadership to do so, but the delay 
during the wildcat strike is clearly one of the main failures by the union. Ntuli also mentioned 
that: "Comrade Vavi tried to convince the workers to return to work." (Ntuli, interview, 2002) 
However, without any success. 
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Already in the early 1990s Maller pointed to the fact that discipline is a big problem within 
the union: "Surprisingly, only six percent identified 'discipline' as an area of legitimate 
worker decision-making under circumstances of great tension about disciplinary issues." 
(Maller, 1992: 145). She also quotes one production manager: "We don't have an effective 
remedy for people who don't follow procedures on a collective basis." (Maller, 1992: 144). 
Eight years later the union and company still had the same problem. Therefore it is 
understandable that the company said that "the regular un-procedural strikes had to come to 
and end" (Hunneyball, interview, 2002; Uhl, interview, 2002). 
4.3.2. The Uitenhage Crisis Committee (UCC) 
The UCC was established during the 2000 wildcat strike. The chairperson was Wilfus 
Ndandani, a former Good Year employee. The UCC also included a women's group, the 
wives of formerly employed VW workers. The UCC organised several demonstrations in 
Uitenhage and was a spontaneous support association for the dismissed workers and shop 
stewards. The committee does not exist anymore. The Crisis Committee had a very 
'traditional' approach towards the company. The latter was constantly demonised and charac-
terised as the 'enemy'. During the strike the committee was very reluctant to participate in 
mediation when the company tried to speak to its leaders. 
During an interview with Mr. Ndandani he repeatedly blamed the ANC/COSA TU/SACP 
leadership for selling out on workers' rights won during apartheid. Not in one sentence was it 
mentioned that the 13 shop stewards tried to take over union structures at the company. Now 
in the aftermath of the conflict it is clear that the UCC carried some of the responsibility for 
the outcome of the conflict. 
4.3.3.The Oil Chemical General & Allied Workers Union (OCGAWU) 
Besides the UCC, the Oil Chemical General & Allied Workers Union (OCGAWU) did build 
the interest group after the split with NUMSA. OCGA WU organised the lawyer for the 
dismissed workers. According to Jayendra Surju, the main lawyer at the arbitration, 
OCGAWU was formed as a result of political intolerance in the Chemical Workers' Industrial 
Union, in a debate over the continuation of the tripartite alliance between the state, business 
and organised labour. OCA WU first organised at British Petroleum in South Africa (Business 
Day, Jan 31: 2001 ). 
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OCGA WU became involved in the Volkswagen dispute after the dismissals of the 1300 
workers. At the time ofthe dismissals 80% of the dismissed Volkswagen Workers were loyal 
NUMSA members. At the press conference after the first arbitration session in Uitenhage 
Abraham Agulhas, the secretary general of OCGA WU gave the interview to the media, in the 
name of the UCC, the Workers International Vanguard League (WIVL) and OCGAWU. 
Wilfus Ndandani the UCC chairperson as well as Bonsile Mkezu the main representative shop 
steward, plus German labour unionists were sitting next to him. None of them commented on 
the happenings at the arbitration session. In the beginning of the arbitration process· the 
statements were not differentiated. Later during the arbitration the UCC and OCGA WU 
developed and distributed statements that differed in content, from WIVL statements. 
The dismissed workers joined OCGA WU, because it was the union the shop stewards had 
chosen to represent the workers. The workers attending the arbitration session, were members 
of OCGAWU and not NUMSA, as Forrest states. They appealed against their unfair 
dismissals. 
During the arbitration OCGA WU opened an office in Uitenhage, where workers went to 
gather information about their dismissal. However, the union no longer exists in Uitenhage. 
4.3.4.The Workers International Vanguard League (WIVL) 
The Workers International Vanguard League (WIVL) was founded m 1996. It can be 
described as a Socialist political party with Trotskyist roots. 
The involvement of the WIVL in Uitenhage started on 2 February 2000, when the strike was 
at its height. To give an indication of how the WIVL regarded the corporatist approach chosen 
by NUMSA, I quote from a pamphlet distributed on Workers Day 2000. "As long as 
COSA TU has the current leadership and alliance with forces that hold hands with the bosses 
the struggle for Socialism will always be betrayed. In fact, imperialism and the ANC Govern-
ment needs control of the union leadership in order to control the working class for further 
exploitation by the capitalists. Workers should form action/crisis committees at their work-
places and local industrial areas that are not under the control of the COSA TU leadership -
they should be under direct workers' control and not based on union affiliation" (WIVL, 
Workers Day Pamphlet: 2000, May 1 ). 
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This can be regarded as a categorical no to corporatism. And during a personal interview in 
200 I with Mahomed Shaheed he emphasised that point several times. He strongly condemned 
the NUMSA leadership for being undemocratic, disregarding the undemocratic actions the 13 
shop stewards had taken for their reinstatement into union positions. He further described the 
ANC and COSA TU are "sell outs" to global capitalism. 
4.3.5. African National Congress (ANC) 
One main role-player during the whole conflict was the African National Congress (ANC). 
Besides the president's televised appeal to the striking workers, the ANC tried to convince the 
workers with pamphlets that they should return to work. 
Dismissed workers told me that Mr Mbeki did not come to the ANC party rally during the 
local elections in 2000, because he was "too afraid" (Ndandani, interview, 2000) of the 
situation in Uitenhage. Also, the official ANC Workers Day demonstration in 2000 did not 
take place in Uitenhage but in Port Elizabeth and ex-employees told me that "they could not 
do it here in Uitenhage, that is our territory" (Ndandani, interview, 2000). Many of the ex-
employees were loyal ANC voters and NUMSA members and felt betrayed and ignored by 
the ANC. 
Wilfus Ndandani told me "he (Mbeki) is a 'president's child' (spoiled kid) he does not know 
what is going on here, he is not one of us, he is not like Madiba" (Ndandani, interview, 2000). 
Mr. Smith also emphasised the point that the workers are far more critical of COSA TU and 
NUMSA than of the company (Smith, interview, 2002). 
The ANC and the new young NUMSA shop stewards did not communicate their shift from a 
more socialist approach to a more cooperative approach to capital. The dismissed workers 
felt, that they were not left alone by their old comrades. That is why it was easy for the "13 
senators" to agitate against company and union. 
In the 'struggle' days capital was the 'enemy' and Volkswagen was part of it - in the new era 
unemployment is the main enemy. For the ANC, Volkswagen is an ally to fight unem-
ployment. But neither the ANC nor NUMSA arrived at the point where the local represen-
tatives could communicate this message in a successful way and overcome the old adversarial 
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approach towards the company. Also the NUMSA leadership at the plant did not have the 
power to discipline the 13 dissident shop stewards. 
If a situation of a political vacuum evolves where parties do not articulate the conflicts 
properly usually other political parties try to step in, for their own purposes. This can be seen 
from the action the UDM and OCGWU undertook in Uitenhage. 
4.3.6. The United Democratic Movement (UDM) 
The United Democratic Movement denied in the media that it had circulated a pamphlet in the 
Uitenhage area encouraging NUMSA members to join its ranks. It emerged that the two 
leading spokesmen of the group of striking Volkswagen workers who failed to return to work 
were not NUMSA members or Volkswagen employees. They were described by NUMSA and 
the company as "agent provocateurs" - belonging to other political parties such as the WIVL 
and UDM. This description seems to be valid. 
NUM SA said they were employees of two other companies in the area. One spokesman was a 
suspended Goodyear employee facing a disciplinary inquiry- Mr. Wilfus Ndandani, the UCC 
chairperson. 
The UDM claims its structures in the area were not involved in the Volkswagen strike, though 
the party had a number of members in the company. The UDM said that the Volkswagen 
dispute arose as a result of a power struggle within NUMSA. The ANC and NUMSA were 
uncomfortable with the level of support the UDM was receiving, the latter said. Mr. Smith 
also mentioned the "Bantu Holomisas" at the plant that were frustrated with the new political 
dispensation. 
At the time of the strike the UDM circulated a pamphlet in Uitenhage trying to recruit 
members at factories in the area. The UDM said there was discontent over the marriage 
entered into between NUMSA and the ANC. 
4.3.7. The South African Communist Party (SACP) 
In a newspaper report in February 2000 the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
expressed its satisfaction at progress that seemed to be being made towards the resolution of 
the conflict at the VW plant, and the planned return to work (SACP, Newsleller: 2000, Feb). 
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"The VW dispute is another lesson and warning for the SACP. As has happened in the mining 
sector (with the so-called 'workers' mouthpiece'), there are opportunistic elements that seek 
to divide organised workers with pseudo-radical demagoguery. Small cliques seek to 
manipulate worker concerns for their own individualistic or other sinister reasons. We 
commend the NUMSA leadership for the manner in which they have settled the current crisis, 
and we call on workers in all sectors to be vigilant about the dangers of reckless opportunism" 
(SACP, Newsletter: 2000 Feb). It is somehow extraordinary that the SACP seems to have the 
same approach to the 13 shop stewards as the 'capitalist' B.K. Smith. Hunneyball thought that 
the 13 shop stewards consisted of an old SACP cell. There were no indications that the SACP 
tried to get the dissidents back in line with the official party policy. 
4.4 The CCMA and the Labour Appeal Court 
In 1995 the democratically elected South African government implemented the new Labour 
Relations Act that translated ILO guidelines and constitutional rights into legislation. It was 
passed into law in September as the Labour Relations Act (66/1995). Nedlac carries the 
ongoing responsibilities in relation to the Act, acting in the capacity of governing body of the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). 
Although the Act was 'labour-friendly', there were also signs of shifting ANC economic 
policy: "The ANC at the time of writing (the LRA) is ostensibly 'labour friendly', its road to 
power having been considerably advanced by its labour ally in the form of COSATU. 
However there are signs that during the period since political negotiations started in the 1990, 
that the heady rhetoric of early liberation economic policy has given way to a more pragmatic 
approach to managing a future economy. An ANC in government is faced with a diversity of 
interests in seeking to achieve a growth economy, redistribution, equity and participation" 
(Anstey, 1997: 366). 
The state institutions involved after the strike in Uitenhage were the CCMA and the labour 
appeal court. The CCMA is a dispute resolution body established in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act. It is an independent body. The CCMA does not belong to and is not controlled 
by any political party, trade union or business. It is not controlled by the state although the 
state funds it. It also may receive grants, donations and bequests. 
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The Governing Body is the supreme policy making body of the CCMA. It is made up of 11 
members. They are: three state representatives; three representatives of organised labour; 
three representatives from organised business; a chairperson; (all of whom are nominated by 
NEDLAC) and the director of the CCMA (nominated by the Governing Body). 
The CCMA is the central institution to channel and transform industrial conflict in a 
constructive way. In this case the CCMA became involved in February 2000, but the first 
arbitration session was only held in mid May 2000. 
According to the LRA the CCMA should: 
• conciliate workplace disputes; 
• arbitrate disputes that remain unresolved after conciliation; 
• facilitate the establishment of workplace forums and statutory councils; 
• compile and publish information and statistics about its activities; 
• consider applications for accreditation and subsidy by bargaining councils and private 
agenctes. 
As mentioned above the CCMA tried to arbitrate this conflict between February 2000 and end 
2000. In 2001 the Labour Appeal Court took up the case. 
According to Mark Anstey one major weakness of the South African arbitration system is that 
the CCMA award is not binding on an employer. Anstey states: "While an arbitration 
committee cannot make a final and binding decision on whether an economic decision can be 
taken by an employer, it can enforce a 'social plan' to attenuate the effects of such a 
decision." (Anstey, 1995: 32). The final decision is awarded by the Labour Appeal Court. 
It is worth citing Dahrendorf in this connection: "The second conception (of arbitration) views 
conflicts from a legalistic point of view, i.e., ascribes to the arbitrator the task of judging the 
merits of conflicting issues in terms of fixed standards of 'righr' and 'wrong'. Where this is 
the case, the rules of the games are likely to prejudice the case of one or the other party, for if 
one side or claim is declared right in an ultimate legal and moral sense, conflict itself is not 
recognised and the other party is likely to feel so frustrated as to resort to violence." 
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(Dahrendorf, 1959: 229). I see this legalistic approach as one major weakness of the South 
African arbitration system. 
4.5 The 1999 and 2000 strikes - a summary 
The following description of the wildcat strike at VWSA is mainly based on the CCMA 
arbitration award and the full court document. I added personal observations where I thought 
it was necessary. My own understanding does not significantly differ from the CCMA 
elaboration on the of the events, but I try to add some further information. 
I want to divide the 2000 wildcat strike into three phases, i.e. a pre-strike phase with little 
industrial action, the strike with the main industrial action and a post-strike phase with the 
arbitration at the CCMA and the case at the labour appeal court in Port Elizabeth. 
4.5.1 Pre-strike phase 
In 1990 VWSA and NUM SA signed a recognition agreement. At the time of the conflict 80% 
of the workers and shop stewards were NUM SA members. For some years an internal dispute 
within the union concerning shop stewards at VWSA's plant in Uitenhage had been 
developing. This dispute had its origins in the struggle for liberation. Maller, Forrest, 
Hunneyball, Uhl and Smith all mention the militant past at the plant. Smith described the shop 
stewards that came out against NUMSA as "frustrated dissidents". Maller describes informal 
structures and political struggles being taken into the plant. Hunneyball refers to the SACP 
cell and Forrest refers to the "Indlu yeengwevu" (house of elders, house of senators). 
In 1998 VWSA was awarded an export contract for the A4 Golf to the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Europe. This required that VWSA more than double its local production. In 
order to achieve this, negotiations took place between management and NUMSA and in 
August 1998 the so-called A4 export agreement was signed. Volkswagen claims that the 
agreement was extensively communicated within the factory and NUMSA's General 
Secretary expressed support for the export order. "It remains unclear what the perception on 
the shop floor was. However it resulted in the recruitment of 850 new employees and the 
introduction of new work practices such as group work, a holiday corridor, reduced tea 
breaks, etc." (Brand, 2001: 2). The intention was that the workplace should become more 
flexible and produce according to 'world class' production standards. 
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"It would appear that a group of workers, styling themselves as 'Concerned VW Workers', 
had some concerns with the agreement, with the shop stewards and the NUMSA officials who 
were part of the resolutions which resulted in the signing of the agreement. They wanted 
changes in the shop steward ranks and before the shop steward elections, which were held in 
March/ April 1999, they circulated a list of proposed candidates. The result of the election was 
that about half of the 32 shop stewards elected were new" (Brand, 2001: 5). 
Soon after the election it also became clear that there was division within the shop stewards' 
council between those who were re-elected and those that were newly elected, as well as 
between the newly elected shop stewards and the local officials ofNUMSA (Brand, 2001: 5). 
On 17 July 1999 Volkswagen was informed by NUMSA that it had suspended 8 newly 
elected shop stewards and that they were advised to return to the positions that they held 
before being elected. These shop stewards were the 'concerned shop stewards' or 'senators' 
that did not agree with the A4 export agreement and openly criticised the agreement. 
"Volkswagen advised the shop stewards to return to their workplaces, but on Monday, 19 July 
1999, a few hundred of the workers downed tools and started toyi-toying through the factory. 
The workers demanded the reinstatement by NUMSA of the suspended shop stewards" 
(Brand, 2001: 5). 
The 'concerned shop stewards' mentioned that the shop steward election became an election 
on the new 'capital friendly' course of NUMSA. For the 'senators' it was easy to agitate 
against the new agreement and its changes and against their expulsion. "For the masters of 
resistance", as B.K. Smith described the 'senators', the agreement and their suspension were 
the best means to agitate against NUMSA at the time. 
4.5.2 The strikes 
"On 20 July 1999 VWSA obtained a labour court order declaring the strike action illegal and 
interdicting and restraining all hourly-paid workers from participating in any strike action for 
the purposes of remedying the alleged grievance or dispute relating to the suspension by 
NUM SA of the shop stewards concerned" (Brand, 2001: 8). 
"On 21 July 1999 NUMSA decided to lift the suspension of the 8 shop stewards and the 
striking workers returned to work. But, on 27 July 1999, 18 shop stewards resigned in protest 
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against the reinstatement of the 8 others" (Brand, 2001: 9). The 18 shop stewards stood in 
opposition, because they felt intimidated by the 8 shop stewards. The number of vacancies 
created difficulties in maintaining the labour relation structures and the matter was taken up 
with NUMSA. Anthony Hunneyball, industrial relations manager at VWSA, mentioned in 
this connection that: "The union had a little bit of a big leadership problem" (Hunneyball, 
2000). 
"On 6 August 1999 NUMSA informed VWSA that elections would be conducted in due 
course and warned that no unofficial appointments should be recognised" (Brand, 2001: 12). 
There was no endeavour by the officials of NUMSA to replace the shop stewards who had 
resigned and in September 1999 the remaining 13 shop stewards indicated to VWSA that 
certain individuals had been nominated to replace those who had resigned. "VWSA was not 
prepared to recognise the nominees as shop stewards and a number of meetings between all 
concerned were held, but the matter could not be resolved" (Brand, 2001: 12). The 13 
dissident shop stewards mentioned that the company had a 'black list' of representatives that 
the company did not want in the shop steward council. 
Anthony Hunneyball admitted that the company knew about a SACP cell of 5 shop stewards 
that stood at the core of the conflict between union and shop stewards. VW management and 
the union had enough of the "masters of resistance" (Smith, interview, 2002). The company 
management and NUMSA no longer wanted the 13 shop stewards in the shop steward council 
anymore, because as Smith mentioned they "had not arrived in the new democratic South 
Africa" (Smith, interview, 2002). One loyal NUMSA shop steward mentioned that: "The 13 
actively boycotted or sabotaged union meetings and structures and attacked the leadership all 
the time without specific allegations" (Forrest, 2000: 15). 
"On 22 December 1999, the day before the closure for the annual recess, NUMSA advised 
VWSA that some of the 13 shop stewards had been expelled from NUMSA, following a 
disciplinary enquiry held on 17 December 1999" (Brand, 2001: 12). 
The expelled shop stewards approached Pagdens Attorneys and in January 2000, Mr Zide of 
Pagdens wrote a letter to Volkswagen, stating that his clients were in dispute with NUMSA 
over their expulsion. The Attorney also mentioned that his clients intended to consult and deal 
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directly with NUMSA in regard to the issue and that they would try everything in their power 
to avert a strike and to resolve the internal squabble amicably with NUMSA. 
"On 17 January 2000 the Volkswagen Attorneys, Chris Baker & Associates received a further 
letter from Pagdens, advising that their clients' expulsion from NUM SA had been revoked 
and that they were suspended as shop stewards, pending the outcome of a disciplinary enquiry 
in respect of charges against them" (Brand, 2001: 11 ). 
On the same day, 17 January 2000, NUMSA held a General Quarterly Meeting at 
Volkswagen's premises where the issue of the shop stewards would be discussed. National 
Office Bearers, including its National President, Mr Tom, would attend this meeting. The next 
day, 18 January 2000, Volkswagen received a letter from NUMSA, confirming the suspension 
of the shop stewards concerned and requiring that they vacate their offices. 
On 19 January 2000, NUMSA brought an urgent application to the Labour Court for an 
interdict, restraining the 13 shop stewards from continuing to act as NUMSA representatives 
and from interfering with NUMSA's activities at Volkswagen. On the same day the 
Volkswagen Attorneys received a letter from Pagdens, advising that the urgent application 
had been resolved by way of a settlement agreement in terms of which their clients would, (a) 
cease to act as shop stewards, (b) vacate the shop stewards' offices and (c) return 3 union cars. 
On 20 January 2000 the first day of the strike, a number of workers again downed tools and 
assembled at the main gate at the plant. They demanded the reinstatement of the suspended 
shop stewards and continued to refuse to work" (Brand, 2001: 8). The workers saw the 
dismissal of the shop stewards by the union as a violation of shop floor democracy. This was 
mentioned in the arbitration session repeatedly, and the workers described the dismissal by 
the own union as unconstitutional in terms of the union constitution. Further, the workers 
were told by the 13 shop stewards to go on strike for their reinstatement. Also on 20 January 
VWSA requested NUMSA to intervene, and VWSA also tried to persuade the suspended 
shop stewards to attend a meeting to address the issues. The 13 shop stewards referred VWSA 
to NUMSA and were only willing to attend a meeting in the presence of their attorneys. 
However an employee delegation of the striking workers held a meeting with the company's 
labour relation management. 
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The delegation wanted NUMSA to lift the suspension. VWSA told the employee delegation 
that the suspension of the shop stewards was an internal issue within the union in which it 
could not intervene. VWSA also told the delegation that the strike was illegal and that those 
who continued could face disciplinary action including dismissal. A memorandum to this 
effect was handed to each member of the delegation. Further, the delegation was asked to 
convey the memorandum to the striking workers. VWSA further wrote letters to the shop 
stewards' attorneys seeking to communicate with the shop stewards, and also to the Minister 
of Labour. Copies of the letter were also sent to COSATU, the president of the union, and 
other political leaders. 
The workers who went on strike were basically the workers who elected the 13 shop stewards 
into the shop stewards council, as one shop steward represents I 00 workers. 
On Monday 24 January VWSA handed notices to all employees entering the plant requiring 
them to report to their work stations or face possible dismissal. On both 23 and 24 January a 
document prepared by the ANC/SACP/COSA TU alliance was distributed in the Uitenhage 
area calling on all employees to return to work. But VWSA still continued to experience 
substantial absenteeism. 
As a result of this, the plant was closed from 24 January 2000 to 28 January 2000 while 
attempts were made to resolve the situation. VWSA called on COSA TU and the regional 
leadership of the union seeking assistance. 
On 25 January the local media carried reports of the call to resume work. VWSA published 
these reports on Radio Algoa and other radio stations. The same day an executive committee 
from the parent company in Germany arrived in Uitenhage and a meeting with the regional 
union leadership was arranged. The union officials informed VWSA that NUMSA had held a 
meeting that was not well attended. VWSA also tried to arrange a meeting with the suspended 
shop stewards, but the request was not heeded by the 13 shop stewards. On the same day the 
Uitenhage Crisis Committee was formed in support of the strike. 
On 27 and 28 January 2000 VWSA management and the German executives met with the 
union. These meetings culminated in the conclusion of an agreement between NUMSA and 
VWSA. (See appendix 1). It was agreed that the plant would re-open on 31 January 2000, and 
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that VWSA would take disciplinary action, including dismissal, against workers who would 
continue to strike. The agreement was again widely published in the local media and on the 
radio. 
4.5.3 Post-strike phase, the arbitration and the labour appeal court 
According to VWSA and the full court, the above-mentioned agreement was widely published 
in the press and over the radio. Some of the workers returned on 31 January 2000, but a 
number of workers did not return in accordance with the agreement, and on 1 February 2000 
Volkswagen issued an ultimatum to all striking workers to return to work on 3 February 2000 
or be dismissed. 
The bulk of the workers failed to respond to the ultimatum, and were accordingly dismissed. 
The dismissed workers were exactly the 1300 workers that gave their trust and vote to the 13 
shop stewards, as one shop steward represents 1 00 workers. 
Kally Forrest states that: "The majority of dismissed workers turned to NUMSA to get them 
reinstated and the union immediately took up their cases." (Forrest, 2000: 16). There is no 
evidence to support this statement. At the arbitration the dismissed workers were represented 
by OCGA WU, WIVL and the UCC. Representatives of the above-mentioned organisations 
were trying to get the workers reinstated. I did not see one NUMSA representative at the 
arbitration sessions. 
The thrust of the workers' challenge to the substantive fairness of their dismissal during the 
arbitration and the labour appeal court proceedings was that the strike was a justified response 
to unjust conduct by Volkswagen. 
They challenged the procedural fairness of their dismissal on the basis that Volkswagen failed 
to comply with the audi rule. The audi rule states that the employer has to listen to the 
employee before dismissal. The workers also suggested that the ultimatum had not been 
sufficiently communicated. 
Volkswagen argued that the workers failed to comply with the requirements of sections 64 (I) 
of the LRA and the provisions of the recognition agreement and therefore, that the strike was 
illegal and unprotected. Volkswagen also contended that it met the requirements of the audi 
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rule and that the ultimatum satisfied the requirements of a fair ultimatum. The ultimatum was 
published in the local media; and Volkswagen also publicised the ultimatum over the radio. 
During the arbitration the dismissed workers claimed that they did not know about the 
ultimatum. 
The workers referred the dispute to the CCMA which was arbitrated before Commissioner 
Floors Brandt, who found that the dismissals were "substantially fair" but "procedurall_y 
unfair" (Brand, 2001: 20). He ordered VWSA to reinstate the dismissed workers. 
VWSA launched an application to review and set aside the award. 
The Labour Appeal Court noted that NUMSA had accepted that the strike was illegal and 
unjustified, and that the workers should end the strike. It therefore had no further represent-
ations to make to VWSA to avoid the dismissals after it had attempted to persuade the 
workers to return to work. The court found that the commissioner had misconstrued the nature 
of the enquiry regarding the audi rule as well as the evidence before him by failing to 
recognise that VWSA had afforded the workers the opportunity to state their case not only 
through NUMSA, but also through the employee delegation. Further, the finding by the 
commissioner that VWSA should have dealt directly with the workers and not with NUMSA 
because there was a rift between the workers and their union was untenable. Finally the court 
found that it was clear from the agreement between VWSA and NUMSA that the workers 
were given the opportunity to state their case. The court stated that the dismissal of the 
workers by the company was legal. 
Mr Rubin, the workers' lawyer at the Labour Appeal Court argued that according to the 
International Labour Organisation convention and the South African Constitution an 
employer had no right to dismiss employees for participating in a strike of any nature -
including a wildcat strike (Final Labour Appeal Court Judgement, 2001: 13). 
But judges Zondo, Davis and Du Plessis argued that there is no provision in the international 
labour convention "to the effect that employees can resort to a strike as and when they please 
without following any LRA procedures" (Final Labour Appeal Court Judgement, 2001 :2). 
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Mr Wallace, the lawyer for VWSA argued that: "The strikers were undeterred by a court 
order interdicting them from participating in industrial action on the issue. The employees 
deliberately avoided adopting any reasonable means of resolving the dispute. Furthermore, 
"their leaders" made themselves unavailable to assist in the resolution of the dispute. Lastly 
the employees at the arbitration mendaciously attempted to mislead the commissioner on all 
the material aspects of the case" (Final Labour Appeal Court Judgement, 2001: 24). 
The Labour Appeal Court found in opposition to the CCMA that the company had acted fairly 
both "substantively" and "procedurally" in the workers' dismissal. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 5 
Interpretation of the conflict 
In this chapter I explain the strike. Therefore I want to apply the theory and literature 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
On the one hand there is Dahrendorf who proposes that institutionalised social conflict leads 
to social change and progress. Like Marx, he sees social conflict as a driving motor for 
societal change. This change or progress can be regarded as a function of the institutionalised 
antagonism i.e. conflict between capital and labour. Besides the social change and progress, 
the institutionalisation of the conflict leads to a number of problems Hyman, Michels, Lipset 
and Lester elaborated on: oligarchic tendencies within the union, increased power at the top of 
the union bureaucracy, professionalisation of the union leadership. 
On the other hand there are conflict sociologists like Simmel and Coser, who argue that social 
conflict leads only under unlikely social conditions to social change and progress. They point 
to the integrative and associative function associated with social conflict. For them, the forms 
of social conflict stand in the centre of interest. For Simmel the forms of association build the 
foundation for sociological analysis and not the content. Simmel sees the content of social 
conflict as historically constant, for example the conflict between capital and labour, but the 
forms of association he puts in the centre of his sociological analysis. 
Theorists like Fukuyama, Anstey and Banks argue that trust and worker participation are 
means to regulate and mediate the antagonism between capital and labour in times of 
increased global competition and lean production. 
Keller highlighted the significance of informal labour structures, Weber and Lipset pointed to 
power and authority problems within unions, and, finally, Webster and Adler explain what is 
essential for corporatism to work. 
I will apply parts of all theories discussed in chapter 3. I argue that parts of all theories 
discussed deliver valuable theoretical background for the explanation of this conflict, but none 
standing on its own can completely explain what happened. I argue that not only the 
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antagonism between capital and labour caused the conflict, but also the 13 shop stewards. I 
start with a question on the background of the strike. 
5.1 What was behind the strike? 
5.1.1 Too little trust 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis Brian Smith, the director of human resources at 
VWSA, emphasised at the beginning of the 1990s that "negotiations must take place between 
strong and representative groups, who have the ability to honour agreements and build mutual 
trust" (Smith, 1990: 231 ). 
I argue that if mutual trust had developed during the 1990s the strikes in 1999 and 2000 would 
not have taken place. Luhmann defines trust as "the reduction of decision options" (Luhmann, 
1968: 21). With the A4 agreement the company and NUMSA excluded one 'decision option', 
the unprocedural industrial action that disrupted production at the company during the 1990s. 
In the early 1990s VWSA introduced Japanese management techniques: "Management 
(VWSA) had recognised this area of worker creativity and introduced aspects of Japanese 
production management techniques to facilitate productivity and quality enhancement. The 
'Jikoda' system involves the authority to stop production and was introduced as a pilot system 
on the combi line in main assembly: all along the line are push button boxes. Operators have 
been trained that if certain conditions arise, they must push the appropriate buttons. For 
example if stocks are running low, or if a part doesn't fit, they must stop the line." (Maller, 
1992: 1 02). However, the practices were introduced to enhance quality, productivity and to 
cut costs. The creation of trust and workplace control was not seen as part of the shift in 
industrial relations. 
According to some of the dismissed workers, very little trust had been created over the last ten 
years. For their part they still clung to the old struggle day approach towards the company: 
"Volkswagen is a white, capitalistic, evil, exploiting company". According to the 13 shop 
stewards Brian Smith epitomises this image. On the other hand some members of 
management share the perception that "there are extreme, radical, violent, communist left-
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wmg labour unions and. shop stewards". Obviously these stereotypes work counter 
productively when it comes to the creation of trust and social capital in the new political era. 
In the early 1990s there were signs that a culture of trust may actually be created. At the time 
Judy Mall er wrote: "While the culture of adversarial industrial relations remained deep seated, 
there was simultaneously clear support articulated by workers and shop stewards alike for co-
operation between management and the trade union. This indicated a possible basis for a new 
kind of relationship developing, based on co-operative, mutually beneficial industrial 
relations. However the ambivalence of workers' perceptions remained dominant" (Maller, 
1992: 111-112). Nevertheless, there seemed to be a clear majority for a more co-operative 
relationship between management and labour representatives among the workforce. However, 
it only came to fruition several years later when management and NUMSA concluded the A4 
agreement. 
For the 13 shop stewards, a minority at the plant, this shift was unacceptable. There was 
potential for more cooperation, but they were reluctant to embrace a more cooperative 
approach. For them the new labour relations between VWSA and NUMSA meant betrayal of 
their ideology. 
It would seem that trust was created between the NUMSA leadership and the company, but 
the union failed to educate the workers. The union did not spell out what the shift in industrial 
relations meant for them. The union did not explain to the workers how legitimate industrial 
action will work and what they may possibly gain from this. 
5.1.2 Limited worker participation 
As discussed earlier, democratisation in South Africa has been accompanied by the growth of 
a range of institutions and processes through which workers and their organisations may gain 
varying degrees of control over economic and social decisions that directly affect their lives. 
These developments are known by a variety of names: eo-determination, worker participation, 
concentration, tripartism or multipartism. 
Before the democratic transition, Judy Maller found out that there was "embryonic" potential 
for worker participation at VWSA (Maller: 1992, 146). Management tried to overcome the 
lack of trust by introducing participative structures at the company. VWSA was one of the 
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first companies in South Africa to recognise an African trade union. According to Mr. Smith 
" ... our position has always been like it is in Germany. If possible we would prefer one strong 
union that can engage management aggressively, hard and can sign binding agreements" 
(Smith, interview, 2002). 
According to Banks, "Participation programmes will only deliver on the promise of increased 
productivity and efficiency if the focus of the programme is the full participation of workers 
and there is a strong enough union to enforce an agreement to get managers to cede their 
power to workers" (Anstey, 1995: 102-103). However, at VWSA power was ceded to shop 
stewards and only partly to workers. The only form of direct worker participation was the 
'General Meeting'. Most ofthe power and authority was ceded to shop stewards. In the given 
environment. with its militant past, the approach towards direct worker participation was not 
even contemplated by the company. 
The company relied on the union leadership and the shop stewards to deal with the adversarial 
attitude of workers towards management. However, some of the worker representatives 
bluntly refused to cooperate with the company, and the leadership could not convince them to 
do so. There was potential among the workforce for worker participation, but neither the 
company nor the union could channel this potential into effective structures of participation. 
5.1.3 No shared gains from lean production 
As discussed in chapter 2, international competition forces greater flexibility on Volkswagen 
South Africa. Therefore the company had to modernise production to become competitive on 
the world market. The modernisation can be described as a shift from Fordist production to 
'lean production'. 
Anstey argues that under Lean Production there is a shift from "extractive towards wealth 
creative" industrial relations (Anstey, 1995: 11 ). I argue that in the heyday of Fordism a high 
wage philosophy reigned in industrialised countries. This regulation approach was chosen to 
sustain the mass production/consumption paradigm. But in the case of YWSA the people that 
build the car, cannot buy the car. The cars are exported. The A4 export agreement merely 
perpetuates "racial fordism" in South Africa. 
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Not only that. Some of the shop stewards argued that under the agreement conditions of work 
actually deteriorated. Bonsile Mkezu, one of the '13 senators' complained: "Improvements 
which we had gradually won in the apartheid period were taken back. Wages and working 
conditions are now worse than they were in the apartheid period" (Rachleff, 2000: 3). This 
was unacceptable to the ' 13 senators'. 
Anstey argues that industrial relations under genuine 'lean production' are cooperative and 
participative. However, at VWSA there was no direct worker participation. Adversariallabour 
relations between company and workers remained dominant even after the A4 agreement had 
been signed. According to Brian Smith, this adversarial approach remains because South 
Africa is a "highly class-divided" society. He thought that corporatism works in Germany 
because Germany is a "less class-divided" society than South Africa (Smith, interview, 2002). 
I would agree with Smith. However, he failed to suggested that it is partly in the power of 
VW to narrow this class divide. It would appear that VWSA introduced lean production, but 
tried to reduce costs at the same time. The shift from 'extractive' to 'wealth creative' 
industrial relations did not materialise. 
The company undertook the shift towards lean production, but left worker participation and a 
wealth creative wage philosophy out of the equation. The union did not challenge the 
company hard enough to introduce a wealth creative philosophy. The union was satisfied with 
the 800 new jobs created with the A4 agreement. Lean production was only partly introduced. 
Mr. Hunneyball, industrial relations manager at plant admitted that the A4 agreement did not 
result in better working conditions and increased wages: "No there was no increased wage as 
a consequence of the A4 agreement, I mean the wages are regulated on a national industry 
level. Working conditions ... in terms of the facilities a definite improvement, because there 
complete new lines were brought in, new rest areas, new technology, etc. There were in the 
region of 800 new jobs that we created. But no direct wage increase. The company has 
incentives schemes and a bonus at the end of the year in addition to the normal contractual 
wage, but that wasn't part of the agreement" (Hunneyball, interview, 2002). 
The A4 agreement did not bring the expected rising living standard for the workers. 
Accordingly areas of conflict and worker protest increased. 
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The hopes of workers as articulated by Bonsile Mkezu, one of the 13 shop stewards, were 
dashed: "With the end of apartheid and the fresh election of a new government, which had 
really been voted into power by us, we had big hopes that our situation would improve" 
(Rachleff, 2000: 3 ). However, according to Peter Rachleff, " ... these workers were earning, I 
hasten to add, little more than R 7 an hour, while the cars they were producing were being sold 
in the high income, high priced European market" (Rachleff, 2000:2). The dismissed workers 
experienced the A4 agreement as a step back from the rights they had fought for and won 
during apartheid. When I take these facts in account, it becomes apparent that the VW 
workers did not share in the gains produced by the A4 agreement. 
The NUMSA leadership failed to secure gains for its members. They may have fallen victim 
to the increased personal security that comes with the institutionalisation of the union: 
"Increasing security for the union and for the present leadership serves as moderating 
influence; less rivalry and fewer challenges reduce the pressure and incentives for militant 
exploitation ofunions' bargaining power" (Lester, 1958: 112). I argue that Lester is right, but 
the extreme security the union gained with capital and the labour-friendly ANC government 
created the impression that "the union is in bed with management". As a result, the 13 shop 
stewards demanded "militant exploitation of bargaining power" or simply higher wages and 
better working conditions. These NUMSA did not deliver. At VWSA the organisation of 
work underwent a shift to "lean production", but this was not accompanied with "post-
Fordist" gains for workers. 
5.1.4 Informal shop floor power 
In her study of an American automobile plant, Marianne Keller pointed to the importance of 
informal communication structures for understanding production (Keller, 1989: 119). This is 
also true in the Volkswagen case. Judy Maller highlighted the informal labour structures at 
VWSA in the early the 1990s. Smith and Hunneyball both said that these informal structures 
evolved during apartheid. They were informal because labour unionists feared the racist 
regime. The regime changed, but the informal labour structures remained in place. For Hans 
Jtirgen Uhl, secretary general of the International Volkswagen Workers' Council, this is the 
main reason behind the strike. He argued that the 13 shop stewards acted in a way as if the 
liberation had not taken place in 1994 (Kempe, 2000: 68). 
65 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Brian Smith made the following comment on these informal structures: "I wouldn't call them 
labour structures, they were just some opportunists. They at all times claimed to be members 
of NUMSA. I personally believe they were some sort of opportunists, mainly driven by their 
desire to get financial rewards. They thought they could form a separate union. But 
particularly they knew they had no chance, if they moved out of NUMSA, because of 
NUMSA's link to the ANC, SACP, COSATU. Politically they knew they could not move out 
of the NUMSA structure, because everyone here who came out against the ANC has no 
chance." (Smith, interview, 2002). 
According to Smith the 13 shop stewards were " ... groups of people who couldn't come to 
terms with transition in South Africa. Their whole understanding in life, and clearly it was 
caused by apartheid, was struggle, they couldn't come to terms that we were a democracy. 
That we were a new economy, they still believed if you don't get your way you struggle, you 
resist. That was the politics prior to 1990 and my view on the profile of the people dismissed 
they were guys who came out of, they weren't the younger people who had grown up with the 
new politics, they were old guys. People were very badly mislead by very opportunistic 
leaders, people more interested in their own agenda than a broader worker agenda. Very low 
on, tried to use the issue of mass democracy, the way they operated was anything but mass 
democracy" (Smith, interview, 2002). 
The local and national NUMSA leadership knew about the informal structures at the 
Volkswagen plant. The leadership of the union did not review the A4 export policy in the 
light of the concerns the 13 elders expressed. After meetings the regional union leadership 
chose to suspend the shop stewards for "inciting and misleading" the workers. According to 
Slumko Nodwangu, a shop steward loyal to NUMSA, " ... workers used intimidatory tactics 
which were associated with VW struggles during the 1980s. These kinds of tactics in these 
times with the new LRA were inappropriate" (Forrest, 2000: 16). 
The company was informed about the suspenston of the shop stewards by NUMSA. 
According to Mr. Hunneyball, " ... NUMSA was experiencing a real problem. We saw that for 
example those people were appointing new shop stewards. We knew that they were doing 
this, that wasn't in accordance with NUMSA constitution. So we were aware that there was a 
lot of conflict between this grouping and NUMSA. NUMSA was entitled to call those people 
being elected, the office bearers of the union to call them to order or deal with them in 
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accordance with their structures. It was a little bit scrappy, whether they were suspended or 
dismissed there was some conflict in understanding in what was actually going on. From our 
perspective I don't think it was out of line for them to actually deal with the problem" 
(Hunneyball, interview, 2002). This statement creates the impression that the company was 
happy that the union finally emancipated itself from the old struggle days and the "masters of 
resistance" (Smith, interview, 2002). 
Under "labour stability and flexibility" the A4 export agreement states: "Both parties confirm 
that in order to ensure we keep this order and achieve daily schedules, no illegal and 
unprocedural industrial action can be tolerated and to this end, all employees and management 
agree to strictly follow all relevant dispute and grievance procedures. The parties agree that 
industrial action will result in the cancellation of this order and result in job losses" (A4 
Export Agreement, 1998). The NUMSA shop stewards and the company signed this 
agreement on 27 August 1998 (see Appendix 11). 
Nevertheless, the 13 shop stewards did not stick to the agreement. The informal shopfloor 
structures came up against the formal leadership of the union. It was not the first time this had 
happened at VWSA. Already in the early 1990s " ... there were clearly informal networks 
within various departments of VWSA, which demanded the allegiance of some shop 
stewards. This tension between the formal leaders of the union and the informal leadership 
has on occasion led to a breakdown in the democratic structures of shop floor unionism. 
Seventeen percent of shop stewards identified 'workers not following procedures' as one of 
the major causes of recent strikes" (Maller, 1992: 115). The tension between the formal 
leaders of NUM SA and the informal leadership of the 13 shop stewards led to the breakdown 
in the "democratic structures of shop floor unionism". The 13 shop stewards could not accept 
that all their power had been taken away by the regional leadership of the union. As a result 
they mobilised the 1300 workers. 
Although company and union knew about the informal labour structures at the plant since the 
beginning of the 1990s, neither succeeded in incorporating these into the formal structures of 
the union or to neutralise the power of the dissidents. 
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5.1.5 Crisis of leadership and ideology at NUMSA 
Lester, Michels and Hyman elaborated that a number of leadership problems can evolve with 
the maturation of labour unions. 
According to Jeremy Baskin organised labour in South Africa has lost significant layers of 
leadership to government, political office and the corporate sector since the political transition 
in South Africa. He argues that this 'brain drain' has seriously dented the pool of skills and 
experience developed during the years of struggle (Baskin, 2000: 48). This problem also 
affected NUMSA at VWSA. 
Besides this leadership crisis, Forrest points to a crisis of ideology: "Older members had 
grown up in the 1980s rhetoric - and this was especially true of auto factories in the Eastern 
Cape - where there were times when it seemed that workers would wrest control of factories 
from employers. From this perspective this new era of eo-determination with management 
looked like a sell out" (Forrest, 2000: 16). However, NUMSA neglected to teach their 
membership that eo-determination and worker participation can be a means to "wrest control 
from management" in democratic times. Slumko Nodwangu, NUMSA shop steward admits: 
"In fact at the point of production a great deal needs to be done to inform members of micro-
and macro-economic relations - a great deal of education needs to be done" (Forrest, 2000: 
1 7). As a result NUM SA did not succeed in diffusing the concerns of the 13 shop stewards. 
The A4 agreement does not state from where the company starts to transform, as it only 
mentions that the target is "world class production". Listening to dismissed workers' 
complaints it became apparent that the transformation process was not communicated 
sufficiently by the union. Mr. Smith thought that many shop stewards "did not know, what 
was going on" (Smith, interview, 2002). 
The conflict situation at the plant escalated through the suspension of the shop stewards by the 
union, and the workers started to strike illegally. The company finally accepted that there 
were informal structures at the plant and did speak to the worker delegation in order to 
mediate, but without any success. For the first three days of the strike NUMSA leadership 
appeared to be too afraid to visit the plant (Forrest, 2000: 19). Nor was an independent 
mediation body like IMSSA called in. 
68 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The union had the authority, but not the power to discipline the 13 shop stewards. The main 
reason for this was the weak NUMSA leadership. The union knew for over half a year that the 
13 shop stewards caused problems at the plant, but did not intervene. The meetings that were 
eventually held with the 13 did not result in a peaceful solution of the problem. At that stage 
the only option left was to suspend the 13 shop stewards. 
Ideally the NUMSA leadership should have convinced the 13 shop stewards during the 
disciplinary meetings that the union is not 'selling out' to management, that increased 
communication with management is a means to gain 'workers control' under conditions of 
democracy, and finally, that the increased production will result 'wealth creative' wages and 
better working conditions. This did not happen in 1999. 
5.1.6 Union authority without power 
Dahrendorf and Weber both make a distinction between power and authority. They argue that 
the difference between power and authority consists in the fact that power is essentially tied to 
the personality of individuals, whereas authority is always associated with social positions or 
roles. Authority can also be described as legitimate power. In the VW case, the NUMSA 
leadership had all the authority, but not the power to discipline the dissident shop stewards or 
the workers who supported them. 
During the 1990s a split developed between the union leadership and the rank and file on the 
shop floor at VWSA. According to Rachleff, the increasing distance between leadership and 
the shop floor was also apparent at the signing of the A4 agreement: "NUM SA had agreed to 
all of these changes without once giving the workers an opportunity to vote them up or down. 
Not only did the acceptance of these changes by union officials who did not have to work 
under them anger the workers, but it also contradicted the VW local's own traditions of 
internal democracy" (Rachleff, 2000: 2). 
Rachleff is wrong on this point, because the NUMSA shop stewards did agree to the A4 
export order, but the 13 shop stewards who could not come to terms with their defeat in the 
shop steward council started to assault and intimidate the shop stewards loyal to NUMSA. 
They abused their positions of power. 
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The same shop stewards had been black-listed by the company. Hunneyball admitted that 
there was "a lot of frustration" at industrial relations management with the informal structures 
at the plant, i.e. the 13 shop stewards. The company held them responsible for unprocedural 
industrial action in 1997, 1998 and 1999. 
Both the company and the union had had enough of "the senators". They were identified by 
Dr. Schuster, a VW crisis manager especially flown in from Wolfsburg in Germany, as some 
of the striking workers that would face disciplinary action after re-opening of the plant 
(Uitenhage Press Conference, 2000). 
All attempts by NUMSA to defuse the conflict were unsuccessful. One of the major problems 
of both management and NUMSA was that the majority of shop stewards had the authority 
and were loyal to NUMSA, but not the power to restrain workers in certain situations. There 
was a discrepancy between union power and union authority. The power of the union was 
only restored after the judgement of the labour court. 
According to Dahrendorf " ... where there are authority relations, the super ordinate element is 
socially expected to control, by orders and commands, warnings and prohibitions, the 
behaviour of the subordinate element" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 232). The "super ordinate" 
element, the NUM SA regional leadership tried to control the "subordinate element", the 13 
shop stewards, but they were not successful, because the 13 shop stewards had power, i.e. the 
support of 1300 workers. 
In Lipset's view, union officials develop a vested interest in maintaining their position: "The 
leaders want to stay in office. Every trade union official has moved up in the status hierarchy 
by becoming an official. Once high status is secured, there is usually a pressing need to at 
least retain and protect it. The situation of the leaders of most unions is such that they wish to 
stay in power and will adopt dictatorial tactics to do so" (Lipset, 1972: 163). This is exactly 
what the 'senators' did. To protect or 'reclaim' their positions in the union the 13 shop 
stewards sacrificed the jobs of 1300 workers. The 13 shop stewards "adopted dictatorial" 
tactics and the mutual non-recognition between the breakaway faction and NUMSA 
intensified conflict at the plant. 
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The 13 shop stewards did not analyse the possible risks for the workers in their decision to 
strike and not to return after the ultimatum. The union and company knew that the strike 
would happen, because they knew the position of a 'communist cell' within the shop steward 
council and their "regular unprocedural industrial action" (Hunneyball, interview, 2002). The 
dismissed shop stewards saw no other way and chose to announce a strike for their own 
reinstatement. For this possibility the union and the company specially designed the labour 
flexibility clause in the A4 agreement and accordingly dismissed the striking workers and 
shop stewards. 
The approval of the A4 export agreement can be described as one underlying problem of the 
conflict; the missing trust between union leadership and the 13 shop stewards as the second 
problem. And the suspension of the shop stewards by the regional leadership of NUMSA as 
the proverbial "last straw" that broke the camel's back. Only after the strike could the union 
reassert its power at the plant. 
5.2. Failure to regulate the conflict 
All social conflict theorists discussed pointed to the importance of mutual recognition of 
conflicting parties. For Simmel and Coser recognition can be described as one of the functions 
of social conflict. Once recognition is reached negotiations can take place between the parties 
and the most violent forms of conflict can be avoided. Therefore only after mutual recognition 
can mediation and arbitration take place. For the duration of the conflict, this did not happen. 
The intensity of the conflict decreased with the advent of the arbitration. Fewer people came 
to the arbitration sessions as they proceeded, fewer demonstrations were held. The dismissed 
workers respected the effective regulation by the CCMA and Labour Appeal Court, even 
though they lost the case. 
As discussed, the Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (IMSSA) did not mediate 
between union and breakaway faction before the wildcat strike in February 2000. The 13 shop 
stewards were not properly recognised by NUMSA. This intensified the conflict. Kally 
Forrest named one heading in her article "Dealing with Indlu yeengwevu" (Forrest, 2000: 14) 
and then mentions lrvine Jim who claims that the 13 attacked union leadership without 
"specific allegations". The specific allegations were the concerns the 13 had with the A4 
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agreement and the corporatist industrial relations between NUMSA and VWSA. I come to the 
conclusion that the union did not want to deal with the Indlu yeengwevu anymore because of 
their constant opposition in the shop steward council and intimadory tactics. 
On the other side, after the suspension the 13 shop stewards did not recognise NUMSA as 
their union anymore. This led to more conflict and the wildcat action - non-recognition on 
both sides. 
Dahrendorf elaborated that the intensity and violence of social conflicts are dependent on 
various factors. "The violence decreases to the extent that the conditions of class organisation 
are present" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 239). For Dahrendorf, "class organisation" is a union. The 
class organisation I see in this conflict were the 13 shop stewards that misled the workers. I 
want to describe it as an institutionalised, and led wildcat strike. The 13 shop stewards took 
the power to pursue their own agendas. They were the institution the workers trusted in. 
Conflict potential increased because this 'institution' was not recognised by NUMSA and on 
the other hand did not want to recognise NUMSA anymore. 
Further Dahrendorf states: "The violence of class conflicts decreases to the extent that class 
conflict is effectively regulated" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 239). The 'militancy' of the conflict 
increased during 1999, because the regional and local NUMSA leadership was too weak to 
regulate and control the conflict in a constructive manner. There were 18 NUMSA loyal shop 
stewards and 13 dissenting shop stewards, the 18 resigned in protest against the 13. The 18 
saw no other way to call for help form the regional office, because they felt "useless with no 
unity to take up issues" (Forrest, 2000: 15). Unity was not restored through recognition of the 
breakaway faction. The suspension of the 13 shop stewards through the regional union 
leadership led to the wildcat strike. 
Compared to other social conflicts in post apartheid South Africa, the conflict in Uitenhage 
can be described as peaceful. No one was killed. Compared to the social conflicts of the 
1980s, it can be described as very peaceful. 
The workers saw the elected '13 senators' as their legal representatives. That is why they 
named them the 'senators'. During the strike, the company spoke to the representatives of the 
striking workers and recognised them as an interest group. Further, the company wrote letters 
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to leading union and government officials calling for help. A political mediation between 
union and breakaway faction did not take place. Dahrendorf states that mediation in such 
conflicts is one main responsibility for the political arena. However, like the union, the South 
African president and government did not recognise the workers as a legitimate interest 
group. This did not settle the strike situation at the plant and led to the ultimatum. 
The senators erected structures besides existing NUMSA and company structures. These can 
be described as an informal network within the company that stood in opposition to all the 
changes NUMSA had agreed on. Surely the strike was illegal, but smaller industrial action 
took place from 1996 to 1999. Compared to the eighties as Mr. Fred Sauls, a well-known 
labour activist in the area, explained to me the strike was not "too serious" (Sauls, interview, 
2000). 
It is worth quoting Hyman in this connection: "The maximum weapon against the system is a 
simple absence - the strike, which is a withdrawal of labour. It can win wage increases, some 
improvements in working conditions, in rare cases some constitutional rights. But it can never 
overthrow a social regime. As a political weapon, strikes are nearly always profoundly 
ineffectual. The strike is fundamentally an economic weapon, which easily boomerangs if 
used on terrain for which it is not designed" (Hyman, 1989: 48). The strike in Uitenhage was 
not an economic weapon. I describe it as a political one for the reinstatement of the shop 
stewards. The 'boomerang' hit heavily in Uitenhage, and the 1300 workers feel it. In other 
words, Hyman was proven right. 
Maller explained how 'agitators' came into the company: "Members of the labour relations 
department claimed that a 'faction' was emerging within NUMSA comprising younger and 
more militant workers who had been employed during the previous three years when VWSA 
took on younger workers in an attempt to halt growing unemployment amongst school 
leavers. This group was attempting to take over the reins of power within NUM SA, according 
to management sources, and was extremely vociferous at general meetings with calls to 
action. NUMSA leadership, desperately trying to retain its position, was unable to withstand 
these pressures" (Maller, 1992: 126). Some of these younger more militant workers later 
became members of the 'house of senators', who were not all 'elders', but experienced 
activists. The small 'factions' problem existed since the end of apartheid and was not actively 
addressed by NUM SA before the suspension of the 13 shop stewards. 
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Anstey states: "Research in the Eastern Cape reveals that while over 80% of industrial action 
is unprocedural, fewer than 2% of workers involved are dismissed as a result of their action" 
(Anstey, 1995: 3 ). This fundamentally changed in 2000, unprocedural industrial action 
resulted in dismissal. NUMSA backed this change without 'educating' (Forrest, 2000: 17), its 
members before. The 'education' of workers and shop stewards by the ANC and COSA TU 
started during the conflict, too late for the workers. The union knew about the breakaway 
faction problem at the plant and did not control the situation. 
"The closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict" (Coser, 1964: 67). The relationship 
between the workers and their shop stewards can be described as very close, this is the reason 
for the non-return to the company after the ultimatum was run out. The shop stewards were 
the 'senators', trusted and respected, and the workers followed their advice, no matter what 
ultimatum the company or union set for 'workers' unity'. The relationship between the 13 
shop stewards and union also was very close. That is one reason for the intense but non-
violent conflict. 
The decision by the union to suspend the 13 shop stewards is the core reason for the wildcat 
strike. This fact, and the militant tradition that evolved during the struggle for liberation, we 
have to keep in mind when we try to understand why the workers engaged in a wildcat strike. 
The A4 agreement also can be described as a zero tolerance approach to unprocedural 
industrial action. The happenings in February 2000 were the first case, where the company 
and NUMSA applied the zero tolerance approach. This zero tolerance approach became 
necessary because as Hunneyball mentioned "the Germans wanted commitment" and "the 
regular unprocedural industrial action had to come to an end" (Hunneyball, interview, 2002). 
The 13 shop stewards and their followers had the power to bring the whole company to a halt 
and to stop production completely for even longer than they did. The 13 shop stewards did not 
at any time have the authority to do so - neither legitimised by the workforce or from the 
union or any other legal body. 
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NUMSA tried to discipline the breakaway shop stewards. The shop stewards argued during 
the arbitration that this was an illegal step taken by the union, disregarding the illegal action 
they themselves had chosen to take. 
The shop stewards considered their suspensiOn as a violation of the umon constitution. 
NUMSA's approach remains questionable, i.e. that if the shop stewards did not agree with 
their policy, they would simply "kick them out". On the other hand the 13 shop stewards also 
violated the union constitution, because they started to build structures outside of the official 
union structures. NUMSA's approach cannot be described as 'oligarchic', but in the long run 
NUMSA's strategy will not strengthen the union. As Dahrendorf argued, "suppression leads 
only to more intense conflicts in the long run" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 239). 
I want to conclude that the non-recognition of the Indlu yeengwevu by the union intensified 
the conflict. The union did not deal with this group actively before their suspension, and 
IMSSA did not mediate. This behaviour by the union helped the 13 shop stewards to become 
a powerful integrated group at the plant. The CCMA conflict mediation took place after the 
dismissals and strike, not before and during the strike. Therefore the conflict itself cannot be 
regarded as having been regulated. I describe the dismissal as being mediated and regulated, 
but not the strike itself. The outcome of the conflict was institutionalised, but not the conflict 
itself. On the other hand the 13 shop stewards 'institutionalised' themselves as the 'house of 
senators', without being recognised as legitimate representatives by the own union and 
company. Finally the conflict cannot be described as institutionalised, but the outcome of the 
conflict, i.e. the dismissal of 1300 workers, was institutionalised and mediated at the CCMA. 
5.2.1 Conflict and integration: forging two opposing blocks 
For Coser and Simmel, integration is one function of social conflict. On the one side the 13 
shop stewards and their supporters formed one integrated group. On the other side the 18 shop 
stewards loyal to NUMSA, the regional and national leadership of the union, and the 
ANC/COSA TU/SACP alliance formed the other group. 
Simmel pointed to the associative function of social conflict and was proven right in this case. 
The company's determination to get rid of the 13 shop stewards helped to forge a close unity 
between them and their supporters. The 13 shop stewards saw their suspension as a violation 
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of shop floor democracy, because they had just been elected. Many of the dismissed workers 
asked themselves "how can the union ignore our vote?" (Ketso, interview, 2000). 
At the time the Mail & Guardian viewed the suspension of the 13 shop stewards as "a blatant 
attack on worker independence and democracy at the plant" by an alliance of NUMSA 
officials, the African National Congress leadership and management (M&G, 2000:July, 28). 
In a subsequent edition of the Mail & Guardian Dumisan Ntuli, NUM SA information officer, 
denied these allegations and justified the suspension with the threat of the company to 
relocate the production to Europe and the undemocratic action of the 13 (M&G, 2000:August, 
4). 
Nevertheless the vtew that the NUMSA undermined shop floor democracy through the 
suspension of the 13 was widely shared amongst those involved in the strike. It was 
mentioned several times during the arbitration session and nearly all interview partners in 
Uitenhage emphasised this point. "Workers strongly insisted that the highest decision-making 
structure at plant level is the general meeting, which has the final say over this matter and not 
regional union officials" (M&G, 2000:July, 28). 
It mattered little that there were no proper union structures at the general meeting, as the 18 
shop stewards loyal to NUMSA had resigned. The suspension of the 13 shop stewards was 
legal, but with the weak leadership at the plant, very risky. It merely resulted in the further 
integration of the 13 and their supporters. B.K. Smith commented on why this happened: 
"Maybe 600 of them would not have gone on strike, those three days allowed them [the 13] to 
entrench their position by getting workers to believe that NUMSA leadership was corrupt, 
controlled by the ANC/SACP, in bed with management. They got the upper hand in the 
absence of clear communication from the union" (Forrest, 2000: 20). 
Although the agreement was negotiated over a period of nine months and agreed to by the 
union, the 13 shop stewards refused to accept their minority position. For them acceptance of 
the agreement would have meant the loss of gains they had fought for and won during 
apartheid years. 
This was emphasised during the Workers Day 2000 demonstration repeatedly as the main 
reason why the shop stewards had opposed the A4 agreement. The 13 shop stewards felt 
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comfortable with the notion of being resistance fighters against global capitalism - some of 
them had been resistance fighters all their lives. They simply did not want to accept the 
corporatist approach taken by NUMSA, because it would undermine their power positions 
within the company and union. 
5.3 Aftermath: the outcome of the strike 
5.3.1 The impact of the strike on the Uitenhage community 
The immediate impact of the strike was to add to the already high unemployment in the area. 
It also had a minor effect on the local economy and the livelihoods of those who lost their 
jobs. In the wake of the strike one furniture dealer closed down because the dismissed 
workers were unable to pay their debts. Some workers were evicted from their houses, being 
unable to pay their rent. Others were no longer able to pay the school fees of their children. 
The economic impact on the community was only temporary, as the company employed new 
workers who replaced the dismissed workers and their purchasing power. The day the 
company announced that it would employ 1000 new workers after the dismissal, over 3000 
people gathered in front of the gates at Volkswagen. 
Another important effect of the conflict is that the dismissed workers are very critical of the 
ANC, NUMSA and the COSA TU leadership, because they feel let down by "their" 
organisations. On the part of those who lost their jobs and other parts of the community there 
is a great sense of disenchantment with the NUMSA and ANC leadership. 
The organisations spawned by the conflict, i.e. the UCC and the OCGA WU are no longer 
active in Uitenhage area. The community was unable to sustain these organisations. 
In the meantime VW management remains worried about the high levels of unemployment in 
the area and has got involved in initiatives to "uplift" the community (Smith, interview, 
2002). Mr. Smith is currently heading an Uitenhage development initiative that is looking at 
urban renewal. VWSA contributed RSOO 000 to this end. 
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5.3.2 The impact on VWSA 
The Mail and Guardian reported that the two-week strike would cost VWSA R25-million a 
day in lost turnover. The Mail and Guardian used the same figure as Kally Forrest in the 
article "What happened at VW?" (Forrest, 2000: 17). 
However, Mr. Maenger, the MD of VWSA, mentioned at a press conference in Uitenhage that 
the daily loss in turnover was only R5.5 million, so the total loss is not R525 million but only 
Rll5.5 million (Kempe, 2000: 64). Added to this are the legal costs. B.K.Smith estimated the 
total cost of the strike to be around R300 million (Smith, interview, 2002). 
I asked Mr. Smith if the labour relations had improved after the dismissal of the 1300 workers 
and he replied: "Oh ja much. I mean this place is absolutely a different place, I mean clearly 
there is always [conflict]. I mean South Africa which is a highly divided society" (Smith, 
interview, 2002). However, another VWSA human resource employee held a slightly less 
optimistic view. During an informal interview he mentioned that "we have huge problems 
reorganising production". To train 1000 new employees seems to have been a difficult and 
expensive task for the human resource management at VWSA. 
Costs aside, the strike served to reinforce the solidarity between NUMSA and the "Global 
Workers Council" of the Volkswagen AG. The representative of this world labour union 
forum of Volkswagen Workers, Mr. Uhl, did not come out in support of the 13 shop stewards 
and dismissed workers. At a Press conference during the strike in Uitenhage he mentioned: "I 
and my colleagues in the German Metalworkers Union have been supporters of NUM SA and 
their struggle against apartheid since the seventies. We continue to support the national 
structures of NUM SA in their fight for workers' rights. South Africa has one of the most 
advanced and fairest labour legislation in the world, thus we cannot accept the behaviour of 
this minority group and fully understand the positions of our partner union NUMSA and the 
Volkswagen Management. South Africa needs exports to maintain and create urgently needed 
jobs" (Uhl, Uitenhage Press Conference, Feb 2000; Uhl, interview, 2002). 
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5.3.3 The impact on NUMSA 
For Dumisan Ntuli, NUMSA information officer. and Mr. Vavi, COSATU secretary general, 
the VW strike was a "wake up call" or "a lesson to learn", i.e. to review policies and make 
them communicable to the shop floor (COSATU, Newsletter: 2001 Feb). 
The union was reprimanded by Commissioner Brand during the arbitration award: "Basic 
justice between employer and the employee dictates that a decision with such implications for 
those affected by it should not and cannot be taken without the workers or their union or 
representatives being afforded an opportunity to be heard in one way or another" (Brand, 
2001: 18). 
Dumisan Ntuli responded to this by saying: "This thinking, previously unheard of in labour 
matters in our country, signals a paradigm shift and an opportunity to link industrial related 
matters to socio-economic interests. How we shape the balance of forces remains an issue of 
contestation through debates and struggles. In the VWSA matter, we must now close this 
chapter and begin a healing process between conflicting interests that will ensure a long-
lasting relationship between VWSA and its employees represented by NUMSA. We have no 
illusions that this is going to be an easy task to accomplish" (Ntuli, The Shop Steward, Vol 
10.1, Feb 2001). 
According to Ntuli the strike served to revise NUMSA strategy: "We have set a strategy to 
win recognisable gains for workers. We knew that by doing so the union will receive positive 
spin-offs in the short and long term. An integral part of the strategy was to embark on 
legitimate industrial actions in order to build the union and recruit more members" (Ntuli, The 
Shop Steward, Vo/10.1 Feb 2001). This statement Ntuli gave after the wildcat strike and the 
mass dismissals, not after the A4 agreement was signed. 
Other observers seem to agree: "In the future the union will have to work harder at informing, 
educating and keeping all workers on if it wants members to fully understand and support its 
policies. The union can no longer rely on an external enemy to assist in the creation of 
workers' unity" (Forrest, 2000: 20). 
In the view of the ANC, the enemy in the post-apartheid period is unemployment, poverty and 
economic decline. It seems, therefore, that NUMSA may have to take a pro-active stand on 
capitalism, may have to overcome the resistance approach towards capitalism within its ranks 
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and fight for 'wealth creative' wages through legal industrial action. If the union leadership is 
too weak to discipline its own members and too incompetent to sell such agreements as the 
A4, conflicts like the one in Uitenhage are bound to occur again. 
At the same time, the decision to suspend the shop stewards should make the union realise 
that an authoritarian approach to shop floor democracy can turn into disaster - authoritarian, 
because the decision to suspend the 13 shop stewards was taken away from the plant and 
discussed at regional union level. Unless shop floor democracy is respected, NUMSA cannot 
effectively pursue a corporatist approach. As Webster and Adler argue, " ... corporatism 
ultimately depends on the capacity of the labour movement to represent its members, to reach 
and enforce agreements with capital and the state" (Adler, 2000: 13 ). 
5.3.4 The impact on the relations between state and organised labour in South Africa 
During the strike the government position made it clear that it did not approve of what it saw 
as illegal, egoistic action on the part of a minority of militant workers. In the words of 
President Mbeki: "Strikes such as the one at Volkswagen cannot be tolerated. Jobs, a better 
life for our people in the context of a growing economy and our standing in the eyes of the 
investor community cannot be held hostage by elements pursuing selfish and anti-social 
purposes. The Government will not waver from this position" (Mbeki, State of the Nation 
address: 2000, Feb 4). 
The struggle against apartheid forged a close unity amongst appositional groups. Now in the 
post-apartheid South Africa, these organisations review their identities and come to realise 
that their policies differ in many ways from those of their former allies. 
The behaviour of the ANC/COSATU representative, Mr. Vavi, on 2 February 2000, when he 
spoke to the dismissed workers and told them he would come back, but never did so, can be 
seen as an example of trust lost. After this many of the dismissed workers no longer had any 
faith in the ANC, COSATU, and NUMSA leadership, and thought that Mr. Vavi was a 'sell-
out'. This was one reason for the temporary success of OCGA WU and WIVL. The dismissed 
workers were disillusioned with their union and the alliance between capital, labour and 
government. 
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Hans Jiirgen Uhl emphasised that NUMSA reached a crossroads in their development - either 
the union starts to engage in realpolitik, or it continues to fight the ideological battles of the 
past. The strike showed that NUMSA sticks to its alliance with the ANC and the national 
reconstruction position. 
I come to the conclusion that NUMSA has stuck to its pro-capitalist position and alliance with 
the ANC/COSATU, but due to its past the union still has huge problems in educating its 
members on how rea/politik and legitimate industrial action will work in future. Dumisan 
Ntuli said that NUMSA was never 'in bed with management', however he sees the strike as a 
'wake up call' and admitted that the union has to work harder in representing the interests of 
its members in times of globalisation. The strike increased the unity between the 
ANC/COSA TU alliance. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The phenomenon this thesis wanted to explain was: why did the VW workers take such 
'militant' action, why did this 'wild-cat' strike take place and what are its outcomes? 
Regarding the theories I come to the conclusion, that not one theory standing alone can 
completely explain what happened at VWSA. As stated in the preface to this thesis: "We must 
rely on our instruments. Occasionally, we may catch a glimpse below of a land with roads, 
towns, rivers, and coastlines that remind us of something familiar, or glimpses of a larger 
stretch of landscape with the extinct volcanoes of Marxism. But no one should fall victim to 
the illusion that these few points of reference are sufficient to guide our flight" (Luhmann, 
1987: 13) All Theorists provided instruments that helped me to orientate. However 
Dahrendorf, Luhmann, Weber, Simmel, Coser and provided very general theoretical 
instruments at the start of the research in early 2000. Later I had to recognise, that their 
theories were too general to explain all aspects of the conflict. 
Post fordist theory helped to determine the shifts in industrial relations at VWSA. Anstey's 
and Womack's works on lean and mass production provided very useful information on the 
shifts in industrial relations in the automobile industry. Fukuyama's theory on trust gave me a 
new angle to the analysis of the relationship between capital and labour. 
Hirschsohn, Adler, Webster, Maree and Joffe provided essential theory on corporatism and 
industrial relations in the post apartheid South Africa. 
Weber's, Michels' and Lipset's theories helped to enlighten the question on legitimate and 
democratic leadership within unions, whereby Michels, Lester and Lipset provided more 
specific theory, in contrast to Weber who elaborated on the general problem within 
bureaucratic organisations. 
Hyman's theory on strikes also provided essential information: "The strike is fundamentally 
an economic weapon, which easily boomerangs if used on terrain for which it is not designed" 
(Hyman, 1998: 50). Exactly this boomerang hit in Uitenhage and Hyman was proven right on 
this point. 
82 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Each discussed theory gave a point of reference, but due to the complexity of the case not one 
single theory standing alone provided me with a reliable instrument for the explanation and 
analysis of the whole case. Generally the more specific the theories were, the more helpful 
they were for the explanation and analysis of the case. 
Regarding the conflict, I conclude that it was not the first wildcat strike in South Africa, but 
the first wildcat strike with such heavy social implications in the post apartheid South Africa. 
I would argue that there were two processes at work that simultaneously caused the strike. 
Firstly the integration of the company into the global production network of the Volkswagen 
group and secondly the differentiation between the shop floor and the union leadership - the 
latter predating the former. 
In addition I would suggest that a number of other developments reinforced one another 
during the conflict, the modernisation of the production at the company, the 'struggle' 
approach towards democracy and the unfulfilled material expectations of the 13 shop 
stewards and workers after the political transformation. 
Why did the workers choose such militant action? Firstly because they were told to do so by 
their shop stewards. The 13 senator shop stewards were the militant core of this conflict - not 
the 1300 workers. The 13 senators had chosen the means of illegal industrial action for their 
own purposes and agendas, i.e. to retain their union positions. They demanded 'workers' 
unity' from the striking workforce for the reinstatement into their own union positions. 
"Democracy, on the other hand, implies permanent insecurity for those in governing 
positions: the more truly democratic the governing system, the greater the insecurity" (Lipset, 
1972: 163). Ironically, the 13 shop _stewards became victims of the "iron law of oligarchy" 
(Michels, 1911: 7). After all I cannot conclude that NUMSA acted in an oligarchic manner 
because it suspended 13 shop stewards who engaged in illegal industrial action. 
The company, NUMSA, COSA TU and the ANC stigmatised the senators and workers for 
being "ultra left communist". This polarised the workers and increased the conflict potential. 
Coser and Simmel argued that conflicts integrate. In this case it became "us and them"- the 
1300 against the rest. 
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The regional union leadership did not monitor the developments on the shop floor and when it 
was too late, NUMSA undertook 'authoritarian' action. i.e. the suspension of the 13 senators. 
As unions mature, "democratic checks weaken", also in this case (Lester, 1958: Ill). 
What are the outcomes of the conflict? More than a thousand industrial workers lost their 
jobs. NUMSA has come to realise that left wing forces can abuse union democracy, unless 
shop floor concerns are addressed. After losing hundreds of millions, the company is again 
producing at full capacity. Representatives of the South African union, political and legal 
constituencies are asking "What happened at VWSA ?" The conflict has put industrial 
relations and democracy in the era of "reconstruction" under the spotlight. Perhaps the union 
does not need another "wake up call" (Ntuli, COSA TU Newsletter, Feb 2000). 
The conflict did not help to build new parties or associations, but it has forced the ANC to 
seriously rethink its globalisation-friendly policy (i.e. GEAR), lest it wants to avoid further 
alienation from its alliance partners (i.e. COSA TU and the SACP). Latest signs are that the 
party has moved slightly in the direction of the worker federation, whilst continuing to warn 
against "ultra left" tendencies (Mail & Guardian, October 11 to 17, 2002). 
Michael Moore, the 'enfant terrible' of the American labour movement once wrote: "I am 
convinced that, hundreds of years from now, when anthropologists dig up the remnants of our 
culture and study our behavior, they will not be able to figure out why most of the leaders of 
our major labor unions rolled over and let the company bosses destroy the lives of their 
members. 'Just how friggin' stupid were these guys'? the social scientist of the twenty-third 
century will wonder in amazement" (Moore, 1997: 139). 
In the VW case the major union leaders "rolled over" and did not sufficiently explain to the 
shop floor why they did so. When they encountered resistance, the union leaders suspended 
their opposition - the 13 shop stewards. The company, in turn, fired 1300 workers because 
they trusted and supported their dismissed shop stewards and followed their cry for 'workers 
unity'. 
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Appendix 1: Agreement between NUMSA and VWSA 
The parties strongly condemn the illegal strike action taken by VWSA employees over the 
issue of the suspension by NUM SA of the 13 NUM SA Shop Stewards. 
I. The parties agree to the urgent need to establish long term labour stability at VWSA, so as 
to safeguard export contracts and thus protect jobs in the local auto industry. 
2. Should NUMSA members continue to participate in illegal strike action over this issue, the 
National Union reserves its rights to take strong disciplinary action against these individuals. 
3. Before they tender their services at the end of the strike, all employees will be required to 
sign an individual undertaking as follows: 
"That both now and in the future, I will work normally in terms of my employment contract, 
which includes observing all collective agreements binding on me." 
4. The Company has identified a number of employees who, during this process, were 
involved in serious misconduct or illegal actions and at the end of the strike, these employees 
will be suspended pending a fair disciplinary process. NUMSA reserves its rights to represent 
its members in these hearings. Should employees persist with this illegal strike action, 
Management will take further disciplinary action which will include dismissal. 
5. NUMSA will, on an urgent basis, re-establish strong union structures within the Uitenhage 
Plant. To this end, the Union will organise shop steward elections in terms of the Recognition 
Agreement within two weeks of the opening of the Plant. Over the next few weeks, until this 
process is finalised, a NUMSA Official will be located at the Uitenhage Plant in order to 
facilitate this process. VWSA and NUMSA will take all steps to strengthen the organisational 
capacity of the VWSA Shop Steward structures, this will include allocation of money and 
facilities for training. 
Based on the undertakings given in this agreement, VWSA will open the Plant on Monday, 
31st January 2000, in terms of a start-up plan which will be given to NUMSA today. This 
parties will do everything possible to communicate the contents of this agreement in order to 
facilitate an effective start to production. 
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Appendix 11: The A4 Export Agreement 
... ~, .:..~ 
r'' r;, 
1. eRf;AMBL~ 
The parties agree that in ordet to prots~t jobs at VWSA ~nd in the bfcader 
automottve industry, \f'lt/SA has tCI become internationally compotitl-ve :and to win 
and r~tain axport orders ar:d thereby be~om& an integral pir1 of t.t-1• wor1d·wide V'N 
Group. Tne South AfricaM market eannot support saven l~calmanufacturetr1 plus 
Importers, so it Is clear that the future c;)f the South Afric4tl motor industry He• in 
eXJ=Ort orders which wHl enly b• ac:h!Evad, in the fa ea of very tcug~ international 
compet1tfon, by beating er matching th1e best W.J Group q\J;Iity levels, produc:t!vity 
levels, cost levels and deliv~r,; reliability. 
2. WHAi OOES THe A4 GOLf EXPORT CROE.~ M.!-~N ~g IHS 90MPANY A NO. ALl.. 
Ei.V1PLQYEES1 
" VWSA. wflt cacome the blggost vehiete produ<:er in South Africa. 
.. Job. Security for the 4tJO direct empfeye~s who <Jra currently surplu~ to 
local market needs and others who would become sur~lus in 1999. 
The r~cruitmtnt by VWSA Qf approximately 1 OOt~ additional direct 
employaes in 1!88/99. 
ihe cr1!~tion of a lar;t number'of supportil1g job$ in the Port Elizabeth/ 
Ui~nhage araa, a.g, ~_! suppll6~, at' the Harbour1 etc. 
Th& opportunity for employees to roceive training in world class; 
preduc~!on tachniqugs as are applied in the cest automobiie Plants ln 
the world. · 
• Th~ investment of..,.. R 1 SC million- in the local supply 1ndustry in t.,is region 
which wifl C"reats ]~o~. _ 
• Integration Into the worfd~wide VW supply chaif"' which will help to 
prot~ct the Company from fluctuations in the focal vghicle market which 
t.hraatat~ jobs. 
If quality, schedule, cost and delivery !:4lrgats are rr.st on this project. it 
could open the door for additlonall~rge export orders. 
~. WHAT DOES THE A4 GOl,F E.XPOBT ORDER R;QUI_RE ~ROM AL!, Y..'JiSA 
EM PLO YES~? 
-:-i1e parties agrea that in order to gain V'NAG approYal fer this :::Jrder and to ~nsure 
~hat the full order is produce-d, NUMSA. Management and all amp!oyaes at VWSA 
nave to commit to the following: 
a) ~hievement of Qualltt. PrgdyJU1g_o..ang Cost Targe~ 
lt 141 raqutrea that all empJoyeas worklng directly on tha A4 fine or in any 
area supporting the A4 production line oithqt dltac:Uy or Indirectly, must 
commit to tho ~uality ~udft targets1 production schedule for 1998 :2nd 1999 and 
cost targets (thaso to ba flnalisea and pr~sentcd to NUMSA during July 1998). · 
The achievgment of these targets Is kay to this proj•,ct and any 'utur"o ~xpo:t 
projecu.. 
/ ) 
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•< I <'I 
) 
b) <accum wtd! . 
In ordet to achieve quant.y. schedule. cost and productivity targefa, tn• part:1 
.t;ree th:at the concept of Group Wot'k will b~ introdt.ac:ed at WiSA. The A:JIA 
production Unes (plut :aU $Uppcrting areas) "''ut form a pUet for ttli• ""cept. 
Joint Mttnagement/Union Wo~ing Group will ~· ost.ablfsnad to monitor the 
introduction cf Group Work during 1998 an~ to make recommendations on th 
im~rovlJment ofthi& concept bofora this concept Is expanded to the rest of th 
Company in 1999. The agroed new stNct\Jre, rates and functions to be 
Introduced during June 1998, are attached~ ~!JAel'ln]§QI~ 11, 1S §Dd 1.£). 
i) Selection cf the Group I.eaders • tho pe~lt!on of Gro'-lp t..eader wm be 
3dvettised throughout the Comp~any and employees who meet tha minimu 
selecticn critarla. wiff go through a detailed s~te<;tton proces.s and the best 
candidates a$ measured cv this proeesa wm bo appointed as Group 1..eade 
ii) P2.yment of Group L.e~dera. Gtoup !.ea del'$ 'Nill o• paid at thetr o~rreMt 
sJdUs !eve I and rata of pay on their A1:1Pointrn:ant to the ~ositfo~ of Grou= 
Leader, however, from tneit' d.ata of appointment. aU Gf'OUP L$adors wUI 
·receive a monthly allowance of R4CIO,OO. fn order to move to skill hwet 4 
and tc be paid the ma~imum of sMHI level 4~ c~fl Group Laaders must obtain 
the full training eradits required fc•r AMlC (as per the NSF Agreement}. Tha 
Company undertakes to make avaHabfe tc each Group L.eader this training 
within aix months of his/har appoi:ntment lUI a Group l..e•cter. On ·· 
appointment, each Group t..eader rnutt undarbke to participate in and mal<e 
him/herself available for such ttai1"11ing. · 
iii) Payment of Group Members • grou~ membt~• will be paid as p&r the NSF 
Multi..Skilling agreement and may move up to Skilll.ovel 4 based on the 
requirements of tha AMlC c:ortftieatt4. -
c) I.ocrU!la;.J!.t:PJjugtioa Q!J.teut YW9 £JUIJ1Jl1.!eilit!es 
!n order to maximise pro®ctlon output without expentive investments in 
prcduetion "~eifitfes such 'aa Body Shop, Paint Shop. Btc, tha pGrtle• agree it is 
essanti.al that maximum outcut i& aenJe,ved on aYerv coaslble avail~hiA 
!"- _-' r' 
. . . 
production day; this is &specially impomnt as d~ily productJon output will go 
above 450 ~.Jnits par day. In ordfir to maximise the utill$:ition of our current 
investment In the Uitennase Plant, the patties agre1e to the followin\l worK 
patterns: 
Avmil.,bJg .Woain_g..P..f1's ;!~ct.ttollw~w:,i.Qrur 
The parties agree thlat the minimum aM,ual avaHable productlcl'\ days at 
VWSA should be 2$1 days ~xcludit,g Saturdays and Sundaya. ln order to 
achiev(!! this minimum. of 251 prodt..tctJon days, the part!es agr&e to the 
Introduction of the f~Hollday Corrid·or' conc~pt o'IGf a nine week parlcd 
from Novmmbttr to January. lt is agreed that t.hls ooncApt: 
a) involves not all amployeet beinsJ on leave ilt the game tJme and 
that a group of employav• will "".~ri< while c.thera are;; l~va. I ('"'\ 
'/; ~ 
. ,[I 1' ,[ "'. [.f. I, •: .,,, r·, ·11111 
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. .. 
H) 
scntuutela to !:fi ma ntafntd at 100%. tempcraryemptoy.es wiU-. 
Jtl,..d for thfs ho.~Jday ocmdor ~rlod. . 
c) ·Wfu no~ reduce lndlvlcluaf emJ'Ioye•s ;.nnuaJ leave entitlement o1 11 
working clays p.r annu'". 
Cf) A8 this ccnc.pt lnvafyes major changes from the traditional Ytlr .. nc~ 
Plant shutdown, the patllet need to ]oh,tly communJeate ana Mll this 
a;reed change !o an emptoytts. · 
e) Tht det.aU.s· of th• tempcrary rtertJitmtnt. leave tost•rs and other 
details of the annual holiday corridor, wm b•11nali&•d by JuJy eac:h year. 
See Attached exam~le Qf ho~w lhe holfday c:onidor concept wm woric (Altat:ftment i) ,~. 
/'~; 
Shifts and Weel<end ·Worlc 
The partios agree that aFtmplo:rees wot'XIrig on the A3/A4 Production 
lines (l!lcdy/Assembl'yiC?8) and Jn all suppeJ1fng areu auoh· •• L~iatlca, 
Q.A, Paint Shop and Engine Plant, will be reJqLilred to work on a 
c:dntinuous 3 shift bt$i4. · 
Tho partie~ agree to on• paid 10 minute tea break prfcr to th• 30 mfnute 
lunch break ancf after the funch brfak empfc,yees wm wc..X tm the end of 
their s,fft without any break. Thls wiH be appUed to ~~~ areas of the plant, 
not onJy tho A4 Une. The schedt.~le ~s planne·d without tea breaks wm stiU 
be achievod despite .~e Jntroduc'tfon of the 1'0 minute morning tea bre~k. 
See attaehrnenta 3~. lb and 3c fot· how the shift$ wUI orar~ttt. Tht sr~up 
Wcrlc tfme wlU be utfllsed ae and when requir.ed by managernant. 
Shift aUowQnces as s~t out ,in Attachment 4, will be paid to aU employ••• 
wof"i(Jng the above shift partems. 
In order to achieve the A4 production volumes, the partle.s agree that a 
minimum of lwc sehedf.lled ~ t\our waekand st·fifh~ art required rn the 
Palnt Shap and that all other areas wllf be ~qulred to work schaduled 
weekend thifta In ordor to c:ateh Uj:J production lost against tht 
prodvctlon SCMtdl.lfe during thQ pre:YICIUS wee,k. 
d} At"teRdanca ~~ . 
in order iOCompete in worfd:·rnari<ets, the parties agreo that all employees must 
b• at Work on tfmo every day and that absenteeism and late coming must be 
reduced to an absoluto minimum. 
o) Labour Stability and FlexfbiU~ · 
Both P~rtiea confltm that In order tc ensu,.. we keep this order and achieve 
dally schedule$, no Hl&gaJ and unprocadural jndustrial actlon caM be tolerated 
and to tnls et1d, an employees and manag,~ment agrll!e to strictly follow all 
relevant dlsputa and grievance prc:>cedures. The partlu ag"'e that industrial 
action will result In the c~ncarrat!on of this order and result In job losaes. 
. ' 
'.: 
.-.: .. , 
,. 
CJ(v 
. ·~ I . I .11 ;. ': "' I I. I·'': , .11, i·.-· I Jlll 
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......... 1 1J 1 11 I I '-'-"'-'..._ -' 1..1':: # • ~ . . . _ _ ,._., ,_,, . ._, '"'' .. ._ ........ ;. ·- ~ -· t.Ju emproyeoa . 
&p, ;) Bum!b,,nt . 'v .. y ... . • .. '"" '"' I .J-' ,1..._) ; . ..., . 
· ·. · Th• Jl.llrtiH ~are• that all dlroct employ"' 1'80ru1Wd from Outslcle 
the Comp;ny Will go through a tefoction proeeas (thJ' Includes vario&n 
a$sessmtntaltettl) lncf'Havtto·undergo a medlc;f check. NUMSA. wiU assign 
two Shop Stewards to monltot this prec:t.ss. Applf~nts should have a Matrh: 
(ASe Level 4), Technical·: aptitude, lt1aming abilitie$, dJ&pfay group skllfs and 
problem solving abfllti&ti All appntants refen·ed for selection by the V'WSA 
Welfare Department wm be put thro~Agh the sarntaeltcdon rsrcc:es.s as stated 
above, however, they would only l"e(tuire a AB! 1..evll4 at Qpposed to a Mlltti<:, 
In Order to bocom• part of the worfd-wfd,. VW Group export ~hain and to creata and 
protect jobs, the ~al'tJes committhemsel·vas to the l'etter and the •t'lrit of this ;gr&ement. 
. . d fr11 Ac.k~"/ !99j- · Agreed at JJ1tttnhage on the ......... ~ .................................. .L ....................................... ,, 
FO~ ANo QN SEHAL.P OF: 
NUM SA 
~·~·~o'!!;=~· ;::: ::4~'.,;:·'-------- . I; Wit11ess 
·~1111/0!..0? $8 
"" ' ~ ' . 
:. 
. j -··:' 
. I 
\._/ 
.. I: I• ,, ",.' 1·1 I' I': . '11, :·' 11111 
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PAYMENT FOR SHIFT ANO 'NEEK!NO WOP(J< 
• .,__ ......_.....,. - r rv- •• 
Moming shift$ (Snift 1) 
Attemcon shift (Shift 2) 
Night Shift (Shift 3) 
10% shi~ aflewan(;:e 
10% shift allowanee 
1 S% shift allowance 
· ...... ~ 
• The above will ap~/y to employees working an a 2 or 3 shift basis in all areas of the Plant.. ·· 
• Shif!s to change every 7 days and operate as J'er Attachment 3. 
• Saturday and Sunday shifts wiU be paid at overtime lll1411, llowevar as per the 
Basic Condllions of Employment Act, If a ahi~ WOrlc&IJ by an omployee falls on • 
SLinday &nd another de)- (e.g, Monday), the Whole sMt is deemed to be Sunday 
wotl< if the greater part of the Shift falls on the Sunday, if this is not !he case the great~tr Part of the shift is deemed to have been worl<ad Ol'l the other day and tne 
shift is not paid at Sunday rates, Le, the Suncay night sn111 from 22!100 to 061100 
on Monday is not paid at overtime rates. 
' j: 
.11 I• •I ",. • l·l.llll :> ·11. 1· ''11' 1' 
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'F' .. ----...... 
. In Ordoer to fulfil the mqulrema"ts of !llo A4 Gorr exp"rt order ilnd to tneat ctOm.,.tte 
demand clltrlng Ilia period, June to Ot~lll!let 1888 anct for tire filii year 1999, lh6 PartJ•a 
agree to IIIo following s<:lreduled ~~~~~on daya lor tl!i§ period: 
a) 1" Junt 1991 to 11re1a• Oecambor 1998 • 142 scheduled Plol~ctlon daye, Monday le 
Friday, this lnoludu an extra$ Production days lrom Monday lilt 14" December 1&98 
to Friday IIIo 18" December 1998 whlllll Will be wol't(ed by the A31M Clclf/Jotta 
prodllctfonarees plus supPorting aroas $uch as Paint 81top, Engine Plant, Logl$tlos, 
Q ..... and atlror support se.Mces,JIII•Includet Working on lhe Public lial!day, ltlt 1r' 
Doc•mber 1998 lcr Whieii'Omployt.a Will recelvt normal ovof!tme p~yment fer public 
holfctay Wotic. Details of this extra 5 da11s to be wor~ed will be eornrnunlcated to All involved el'l"'ployeas by Oc:tober 1998. 
b) , .. Ja,.~ary 198ll to a4" Otcem.tsar 1899 z 247 SCheduled produetlon da~. Monday to 
Friday. For 1SSS, lht Plant will close f« a bridging period frotn tlte &11d of shifts on 
Frld•y the 24" Oeeember 1999 until the start of shifts on Monday tlrt s~ January 
2000. In order to pnu:fuce tlle.roqulred proctuetlon Volume for 199a, given the Paint 
Shop <:a~clty oonstralryt of 450 unlll ~•r Cl~~. 25$ sehedu!ed production daY$ are 
requl"'d for 1999. The parties agree .that In ~999, tllesa d;ya will be' mecte up •• 1olfawt: 
Less 
• 
Mlnl(tiurtt <~vallab~o days lnc:tudfng the Hoflday ~Orrldor 
.---,,.. 
251 d~ys == 
4 d.a~ ::r 
24?' days 
aaane 
255 days • 
Bridging period betwean Chrls;tm~$ & Ne'~! Y~ar 1999/.2000 
Scheduled l~tt~rdays J x 8 hour $hlfb to be wcrktd in 199& Pfe~nned produc-tron days for 1999 
In addition to tires• 25S Sellodulocl production days, P~lnt Shop requlrot 2 t I hour 
stdlts each weekend and other procNctJon areas will require wuk•nd thlfts to eatch 
up any ~reduction lest against sch&cfLtfe during ~he wee.~. 
Attached le a broakdown of tlta ag,...d pro<t~retJo~ days per menth for the remalrtder af 1988 *'"d 199§ (Attachment 1), 
. · ... 
-.: 
The above seMQcl"led produetlcin days and w•ekend car.c~ up day• are agr•ed by the partieo, ·. /1, 
Agreed at I.Jl!o n hage on lhe ... 2..b.. .. (],':!,~':!}; ... !?.!.f.._-................... · 
For :and on behalf ot: 
ICfJV4.6.~ 
. ······ ······'-;;1'·· ................ , ......... . u VWSA 
-j~ 
.. /.2. .. / .... ~.: .................  
NUM SA 
! ~ 
\:.I ''"'"'~· , 
'11, t· •. 'I I' 'I 
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SCHEPVLEQ. ~!6PUCIJ.ON OAYJi 1998 ANQ 19fl!J 
Janvary : 1998. : t 199t 
Feoru.ety 20 
Marcn 20 
.. 
22 Aprrl 
M.ty 19 
21 • Jurte 
Jvly .2i 21· 
AuQust 2:3 22 
September 20 21 
Oct~ber 21 <, 
Novem~er 2~ ~1 
Oacembsr 21 ~2 
14i' 
I 17•• j sua TOTAL.. 
~~2 I 247 ,, / Scned~l&d F>roduction S2turdays • I • ••op~ 
-
~ 
-
• 
/ 
I (3 X 8 rtour sMifts} 
! 
I iOTAL 
1 . 14'1 2SS -
I 
• 
) 
: 
'<he above inctu<Jes all sc.~"<:fulaa production days. Monday le Friday, but e:<Ciudes 
"ublic HolidaY$ and for 1999, inc!udes a "holiday ~rridor' in NovemberiDec•mbar 
'999. l'or 1$~8. the A3/A4 Golf line ond supponing areas, will WQrk one extra week 
!rem :ha 14• to 1a• December • including the Fulllic Holiday on the 16"' December (5 
a:ttra days). All Saturdays and Sundays (not inelucjed above), are available for 
scheduled Paint Shop Production {2 x a hour shifts on Sau.rnay morning and Sund>:!y i"lignt) and Coitc~ u~ ~reduction In all other areas. 
I 
l)urlng 1999, tile Plant wm docq for a blidglng ~atiOd between Christmas and New ~ear ••, llowe•er In older to ac:hiiJ.ve !he production ltOiumes. a acheduleQ production Saturdays are required (3 x 8 nour shifts). 
'"".&.91) 
CYti I ~ I ~I !I 
·:I, t· .. · '!Ill[ .• 11 Jr•! u, . ' I ! , \ \ . ~ 
A .,.. ' ' 
:. 
' ~-,1 I ,I ·.1., 1 11 
"i 
·I 
I j 
,1 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
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